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Abstract
People’s judgments are prone to the influence of  feelings, even cognitive feelings such 
as the ease with which related information comes to mind (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007). In 14 experiments, we1 found evidence that non-probative photos—
ones that relate to what people are evaluating, but that provide no relevant information for 
their task—produce cognitive feelings that lead people to evaluate claims more positively.
In Part 1, we examined the extent to which photos promote the truth of  positive and 
negative claims. People saw the names of  several fictitious wines. Some wine names appeared 
with a photo that depicted the noun in the name; other wine names appeared without a 
photo. For each wine people decided whether a positive or a negative claim about it was true. 
Photos selectively promoted the truth of  positive claims, did so most when they could help 
people comprehend wine names, and swayed people’s judgments about the taste of  wines.
In Part 2, we showed that those findings translated to when people judged claims 
about their own (and other people’s) experiences. People “interacted” with several unfamiliar 
animals (on a computer). Later, people saw the animal names again, sometimes with a photo 
of  the animal and sometimes alone, and decided whether it was true that they (or other 
people) had positive or negative experiences with the animals. Photos selectively led people to 
think positive claims were true, and exerted their strongest effects when they could most help 
people bring related thoughts and images to mind2. 
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1 Although the research in this thesis is my own, I conducted it in a lab and supervised a team comprised of  
research assistants and honors students. I also received advice and direction from my supervisors. Therefore, I 
often use the word “we” in this thesis to reflect that fact. As you will also see, I use the word “we” in a different 
context to refer to what is known (or not known) in the wider scientific community.
2 Portions of  this thesis were adapted from: 
Cardwell, Newman, Garry, Mantonakis, & Beckett (manuscript under review). Photos that increase feelings of  
learning promote positive evaluations. 
Cardwell, Henkel, & Garry (manuscript in preparation). Non-probative photos lead people to believe positive 
claims about their recent pasts. 
But I have expanded on the introduction, results and discussion.
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Part 1
Chapter 1
On your big date, a waiter recommends a wine called Yellow Rick. He tells you it has 
impressed many wine judges, tastes limey and slatey, and will go great with the curries you just 
ordered. But you know nothing about wine, so you anxiously ask yourself  if  his many claims 
are true. 
You will probably try to answer these difficult questions by retrieving related thoughts 
and images from memory (Graesser & Hemphill, 1991). You imagine how an impressive wine 
might look and smell, and you “see” judges evaluating its quality. Your search for and 
interpretation of  these thoughts and images will be guided by an assumption that the waiter’s 
claims are true—a possibility consistent with people’s bias to look for evidence that supports 
claims, as opposed to evidence that refutes them (Gilbert 1991; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 
1993; for a review, see Nickerson, 1998). But because you know nothing about Yellow Rick, or 
wine in general, the knowledge you retrieve is unlikely to yield evidence that discerns whether 
the claims actually are true or false. 
Adding to your general uncertainty about the claims is the difficulty you have trying to 
making sense of  the wine name Yellow Rick. Although you can easily picture a yellowish hue, 
the word “rick” is unfamiliar, so the object you are picturing is unclear: is a rick a type of  
bicycle, a body of  water, or a maybe a tree? Put another way, you cannot easily attach to 
“rick” concrete images that help you comprehend the wine name (Bransford & Johnson, 
1972; Paivio, 1969). If  only you knew what ricks were, or if  the name featured a word you did 
know (such as “apple”), you would at least be able to make sense of  the wine name. 
Now suppose the waiter shows you a bottle. Printed on the label is Yellow Rick; 
underneath the name is a photo of  a haystack. You conclude, then, that a rick must be a 
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haystack. Although that epiphany may be mentally satisfying (see Ripolles et al., 2014; 
Topolinski & Reber, 2010), it still does not follow that the waiter’s claims are true. 
Thus, because you have no diagnostic information for evaluating the waiter’s claims, 
your only option would be to guess. And a large body of  literature suggests your guess would 
be susceptible to the influence of  less diagnostic, even irrelevant, information—such as a 
feeling or gut reaction about Yellow Rick (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983, 2007; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 
2003). Several lines of  evidence led us to believe your guess would be swayed by a seemingly 
irrelevant photo that helps you make sense of  the wine name.
Feelings as information
A large body of  literature shows that people will use their feelings as evidence for 
making decisions (Greifenender, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Higgins, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; 
Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). People report being more satisfied with their lives when the 
weather is sunny, and puts them in better mood, as opposed to rainy; people behave as though 
they are attracted to others they encounter just after doing physiologically arousing activities, 
such as walking across a high suspension bridge, compared to less arousing activities; and 
people think cartoons are more humorous if  while viewing those cartoons people unwittingly 
contract facial muscles that trigger positive feelings, compared to muscles that do not (Dutton 
& Aron, 1974; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 
1988). What is intriguing about these examples is that people used their feelings as 
information to evaluate their life satisfaction, attraction to another person, and the 
humorousness of  a cartoon, even though those feelings arose from incidental or irrelevant 
aspects of  the tasks (the weather, heights, and a facial expression). 
Why would people draw on irrelevant feelings as evidence for their judgments? One 
reason is because our experience in the real world tells us that feelings can offer relevant 
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information and foster sensible judgments (Damasio, 1994; Halberstadt, 2009; Unkelbach, 
2006, 2007). Feeling abnormally hot, for example, usually means you have a fever and should 
take it easy for a few days. And cognitive feelings are helpful, too. Because feelings of  
familiarity are typically correlated with repeated exposure to information, those feelings can 
provide useful evidence for deciding that you have seen a person before, a that a song is 
popular, or that a city has a large population (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Halberstadt & 
Catty, 2008; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Put differently, because there are often relationships 
between feelings and states of  the world, relying on those feelings helps people quickly make 
difficult decisions or deal with ambiguous information (Damasio, 1994; Halberstadt, 2009; 
Herzog & Hertwig, 2013; Gigerenzer, 2008; Schwarz, 2002; Unkelbach, 2006, 2007). In fact, 
in some cases using feelings leads to more sensible judgments than does putting out the 
cognitive effort required to analyze reasons for those judgments (Halberstadt & Catty, 2008; 
Halberstadt & Green, 2008; Halberstadt & Hooton, 2008; Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, 
Klaaren, & LaFleur, 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). 
What is more, feelings can point us in the right direction even when we are not certain 
from where those feelings stem. For instance, people can discriminate between word triplets 
(such as salt, deep, and foam) that share a remote associate that links the three words (sea), and 
word triplets (such as dream, ball, and book) that do not share a remote associate; and people 
can make these distinctions without being able to explain how (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & 
Parker, 1990). Although this ability may appear to be evidence people hold psychic powers, 
research suggests it happens for a different reason: words that share a remote associate 
activate overlapping semantic networks and that process produces positive affect that 
discriminates triplets that share an associate versus triplets that do not (Topolinski, Likowski, 
Weyers, & Strack, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). In other words, people 
used feelings that happened to be useful, without knowing how those feelings came about—a 
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finding reminiscent of  when a feelings of  familiarity cause people to “just know” they 
encountered someone before, without being able to put a finger on exactly how they know 
(Mandler, 1980; Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985). 
These findings tell us that people tune into their feelings because feelings can provide 
relevant information for making decisions. But because people’s default assumption is that 
feelings that come about during a task must be relevant to the task, people sometimes pay  
attention to feelings that are actually irrelevant—such as those that are the result of  the nice 
weather, increased physiological arousal, or a smiling facial expression (Dutton & Aron, 1974; 
Higgins, 1998; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007; Strack et al., 1988). 
Considered together, then, this literature suggests that while you evaluate Yellow Rick, 
you would pay attention to how you “feel” about the wine. And you would be inclined to 
draw on that feeling as evidence, even if  it was irrelevant for evaluating the waiter’s claims. 
But what could cause such a feeling? Several lines of  evidence implicate the photo of  the rick.
Comprehension
How could a photo of  a rick cause you to feel one way or another about Yellow Rick 
and affect how you evaluate the waiter’s claims? We know photos can be powerful retrieval 
cues, helping people bring to mind details of  prior experiences (Hudson & Fivush, 1991; 
Koutstaal, Schacter, Johnson, Angell, & Gross, 1998). So if  you had tried Yellow Rick before, 
the photo might remind you what the wine was like, and if  you recall that you liked the wine 
that feeling would support the waiter’s positive appraisals. 
But you have never tried or seen this wine before. So the photo fails to remind you of  
a specific experience that tells you something useful about the wine and leaves you instead 
with only the conclusion that a rick is a haystack—a feat that is perhaps unsurprising, given 
research showing that photos aid comprehension and encourage inferences (Bransford & 
Johnson, 1972; Carney & Levin, 2002; Henkel, 2012; Mayer & Gallini, 1990). 
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In a series of  experiments, people read a passage of  text written in a way that made 
the meaning of  the text ambiguous. One of  the passages described a common procedure in 
this way: 
The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into different groups depending 
on their makeup. Of  course, one pile may be sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If  
you have to go somewhere else due to lack of  facilities that is the next step, otherwise you are 
pretty well set. It is important not to overdo any particular endeavor. That is, it is better to do too 
few things at once than too many. In the short run this may not seem important, but complications 
from doing too many can easily arise. A mistake can be expensive as well. The manipulation of  
the appropriate mechanisms should be self-explanatory, and we need not dwell on it here. At first 
the whole procedure will seem complicated. Soon, however, it will become just another facet of  
life. It is difficult to foresee any end to the necessity for this task in the immediate future, but then 
one never can tell. (Brandsford & Johnson, 1972, pg. 722)
People who saw a label or image that revealed what ambiguous text passages were about (in 
this example, doing laundry) comprehended and remembered the texts better, compared to 
people who did not see a label or image. These findings suggest that when images or titles 
provide context they help people make sense of  otherwise ambiguous, obscure, or difficult 
information (see Mayer & Gallini, 1990).
Moreover, there is evidence people’s subjective feeling is that it is easier to make sense 
of  information with images, as opposed to just words. In another study, people saw several 
Swahili-English word pairs (such as kelb-dog) and for each pair judged how well they would 
remember the Swahili word on a later test. People thought they would remember Swahili 
words paired with photos (kelb paired with a photo of  a dog) better, compared to Swahili 
words paired with English words (kelb paired with the word dog), and reported that it seemed 
easier to learn from the photos (Carpenter & Olson, 2012; see also, Serra & Dunlosky, 2010). 
It is possible that the photos made related information come to mind more easily, and from 
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that ease of  processing people inferred that they had better knowledge of  word-photo pairs 
(see Rawson & Dunlosky, 2002; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). 
Together, these findings suggest the photo of  the rick would help you comprehend, or 
at least feel you comprehend, the word “rick.” Still, for all the help the photo provides for 
comprehending the wine name, it provides no help for evaluating the waiter’s claims because 
it is non-probative. It does not tell you whether the wine really has impressed judges or tastes 
good. But in this part of  the thesis we show that the photo nonetheless affects how you 
evaluate each of  the waiter’s claims. How can that be? 
Cognitive fluency
We believe the answer is to be found in several lines of  research showing that the 
fluency with which people make sense of  information systematically affects their judgments. A 
large body of  literature shows that when information is processed with relative fluency—such 
as when it feels easy to comprehend or to perceive—people tend to see it through a positive 
lens, judging it to be more familiar, likable, and true (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Hasher, 
Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; Lee & Labroo, 2004; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Reber, 
Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz, 2004; Unkelbach, & Greifeneder, 2013; Whittlesea, 
1993; Winkielman et al., 2003). Indeed, people pay attention to these changes in the ease with 
which they can execute cognitive tasks, and they use those changes as evidence for their 
decisions (Dechene, Stahl, Hansen, & Wanke, 2009; Hansen, Dechene, & Wanke, 2008; 
Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). 
Fluency from repetition
We know that when people repeatedly encounter information, they can (accurately) 
report that the information feels more familiar. Why? Because encountering information once 
reduces the effort needed to perceive and comprehend that information later (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Seeing a wine name over and over, for example, would 
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make it easier for you to identify the letters that make up the words and to access the meaning 
of  those words. Said differently, repetition boosts the fluency of  perceptual and conceptual 
processes (for a review, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). And with that boost in fluency comes 
a feeling—typically a positive one—that makes repeated information “stand out” against non-
repeated information (see Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). 
These changes in fluency, and the feelings they produce, can therefore clue people into what 
information they have and have not encountered before (Unkelbach, 2006; Westerman, 2008; 
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2001a, 2001b). That is why people are inclined to pay attention 
to feelings associated with the ease of  thinking: because, much like other feelings, they can 
help people make accurate judgments (see Halberstadt, 2009). 
But recall that people can misread feelings from one source as being “about” another 
(Higgins, 1998; Schwarz, 2004); the same is true of  feelings that arise from repetition. Indeed, 
people use fluency from repetition not just as evidence that repeated information is familiar, 
but as evidence that information is true (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). In one study, 
people saw a mix of  true and false trivia claims. Later, people saw claims again (some they 
had seen before and some they had not) and decided whether those claims were true or false. 
People thought repeated claims were true more often than non-repeated claims (Hasher et al., 
1977; see also, Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; for a meta analysis, see Dechene, Stahl, 
Hansen, & Wanke, 2010). 
Repetition wields similar effects over what people prefer, making stimuli seem more 
attractive or liked (Bornstein, 1989; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc, 1968). In another 
study, people saw words written in the form of  Chinese characters; people saw some of  those 
characters only a few times, and other characters several times. Later, people saw the 
characters again and rated the extent to which they thought the meaning of  the words was 
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good or bad. The more often people saw the characters, the more positive they thought their 
meaning (Zajonc, 1968).
Of  course, repetition does not make information more true, nor change its aesthetic 
features nor the meaning of  words. Instead, repetition changes the fluency with which people 
interact with the information they are evaluating (see Reber & Schwarz, 1999). And people 
mistake feelings of  fluency from repetition as evidence information is true or positive, in much 
the same way that people can mistake feelings from their own facial expression as evidence a 
cartoon is humorous (for reviews, see Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007; Stepper et al., 1988). 
Indeed, although the context of  the task can change the interpretation people impose 
on their feelings, the basic processes are the same (see Schwarz, 2004). People interpret fluent 
processing from repetition to mean there is something “about” the target of  evaluation that 
makes it different from the others, then infer what that difference signals according to the 
focus of  the task: if  judging prior experience ease signals familiarity, if  judging fact ease 
signals truth, and if  judging attractiveness ease signals beauty (Jacoby et al., 1989; Reber & 
Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013; Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman, Halberstadt, 
Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006; for many other ways fluency can be interpreted, see Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009).
Fluency in the absence of  repetition
But repetition is not the only way to cause feelings of  fluency that people use as 
evidence for their decisions. The same feelings can arise in the absence of  repetition and exert 
similar effects. People think words are more familiar, claims are more true, and shapes are 
more beautiful if  those stimuli are presented in ways that make them easier to perceive (such 
as in easy-to-read font or high contrast colors; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Reber et al., 1998; 
Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). Perhaps more to the point, parallel effects arise when 
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priming related concepts, presenting information concretely, or adding semantic context 
makes information easier to comprehend (Hansen & Wanke, 2010; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; 
Whittlesea, 1993). 
In one study, people saw several lists of  words, and after each list, decided whether 
they had seen a target word on that list. People thought they saw target words (boat) more 
often when they appeared after highly related sentence fragments (The stormy seas tossed the) 
compared to loosely related sentence fragments (He saved up his money and bought a; Whittlesea,
1993; see also Lee & Labroo, 2004). In other words, the semantic context in which words 
appeared led people to say those words were old. Just as with the photo of  the rick, the highly 
related sentence fragments were non-probative because they did not reveal whether target 
words were old or new. But against the backdrop of  the loosely related sentence fragments, 
the highly related sentence fragments should have made it surprisingly easy to bring target 
words to mind, boosting conceptual fluency—a feeling people used to conclude words were 
familiar and therefore old (Dechene et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2008; Westerman, 2008; 
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2001a, 2001b).
Other research shows similar patterns, including research on images. Sometimes 
images benefit from semantic context. When paintings appear with related titles or captions 
that help people make sense of  the image, people like them more, compared to when 
paintings appear with unrelated context or alone (Belke, Leder, Strobach & Carbon, 2010; 
Russell, 2003); when pictures (say, of  a key) are primed with related words (key or lock) people 
rate them more positively, compared to when pictures are primed by unrelated words (snow; 
Winkielman et al., 2003); and when images (a frog) on wine labels are primed (by getting 
people to imagine a frog), people think those wines are better, compared to when images are 
not primed (Labroo, Dhar, & Schwarz, 2007). 
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Other times, images provide the context. In one study, people decided whether trivia 
claims (such as “Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches”) were true 
or false. Sometimes those claims appeared with non-probative photos that related to the 
claims but did not reveal the answer (such as a photo of  macadamia nuts); sometimes claims 
appeared without photos. Photos led people to say claims were true more often, a pattern that 
was especially evident when people evaluated difficult claims—much like the one about 
macadamia nuts—that they did not know the answer to (Newman, Garry, Bernstein, 
Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012; see also, Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011). 
These findings suggest that by helping you comprehend the wine name Yellow Rick, the 
photo of  the rick should boost feelings of  conceptual fluency that you would use as evidence 
for evaluating the waiter’s claims. But exactly how you would use that evidence should depend 
on whether the waiter’s claims are positive or negative.
Positive feelings
Let us return to your date, and to the waiter who said that Yellow Rick impressed judges  
and tastes good. These claims suggest the wine is high quality. The cognitive fluency literature 
would predict that if  the rick photo increases comprehension, it should bolster the waiter’s 
claims and lead you to think it is true that Yellow Rick is higher quality. But now suppose the 
waiter tries to steer you away from ordering that wine by saying, with a resigned sigh, that 
Yellow Rick is bland and low quality. Would the photo also bolster this negative claim? There 
are reasons to expect the answer is no.
For one thing, people tend to interpret fluency as evidence that targets are positive, 
preferred, or attractive (for reviews, see Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Winkielman et 
al., 2003). Recall that preceding target words (boat) by highly related sentence fragments (The 
stormy seas tossed the) leads people to call words “old” more often, compared to preceding target 
words by loosely related sentence fragments (He saved up his money and bought a). It is also true 
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that, compared to the loosely related sentence fragments, the highly related sentence 
fragments lead people to call target words “pleasant” more often than “neutral” (Whittlesea, 
1993; see also, Lee & Labroo, 2004). 
Why are we biased to interpret cognitive ease as evidence that things (people, 
information, or objects) are positive? One idea is that because ease signals prior encounters, it 
also signals safety. That is, if  we have encountered a stimulus repeatedly and it has not 
harmed us then we can consider it benign (Zajonc, 1968; see Song & Schwarz, 2009). Such 
an interpretation is mostly functional. Because cognitive feelings reflect changes in our 
environment, those feelings should provide valid cues for categorizing the world into good and 
bad: people we should trust versus people we should be wary of, information we should 
accept versus information we should be skeptical of, things we should approach versus things 
we should avoid (Damasio, 1994; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Haberstadt, 2009; Schwarz, 
2002). Therefore, our automatic assumption that fluid processing means “good” and effortful 
processing means “bad” should help to ensure our survival by producing emotional cues that 
quickly signal when the environment requires us to spend cognitive resources on carefully 
scrutinizing the people, information, or objects around us (Schwarz, 2002; Zajonc, 1968; see 
also, Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Song & Schwarz, 2008a).
As it turns out, our cognitive system is tuned to the environment in such a way that 
easily processed information evokes emotional cues. Boosting cognitive fluency does not just 
increase positive evaluations, it also increases positive affect (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2006). In one study, people liked word 
triplets that shared a remote associate (salt, deep, and foam share the associate sea) more than 
triplets that did not (dream, ball, book); moreover, triplets that shared a remote associate 
activated facial muscles linked with positive affect, a feeling people evidently interpreted to 
mean that the triplets were positive (Topolinski et al., 2009). 
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This literature suggest people should actually “feel” more positively about what they 
can comprehend. A positive feeling about Yellow Rick should bolster the waiter’s claim that it is 
“high quality,” not the claim that it is “low quality”—a prediction consistent with work 
showing people are reluctant to use fluency as evidence for negative attributes of  targets, such 
as that targets are “ugly” or “disliked” (Reber et al., 1998; Seamon, McKenna, & Binder, 
1998). Thus, if  photos boost conceptual fluency and make people “feel” good about the wines 
they should selectively promote the truth of  the waiter’s positive claims. 
Overview of  experiments
To what extent do non-probative photos promote the truth of  positive and negative 
claims? And what evidence is there that photos exert these effects by increasing 
comprehension? We addressed those question by showing people the names of  several 
fictitious wines, all of  which had ostensibly been part of  a wine competition. Some wine 
names appeared with a photo that depicted the noun in the wine name (a photo of  a rick), 
but was otherwise non-probative; other wine names appeared without a photo. For each wine 
name, people evaluated whether a claim about the wine was true or false. Some people 
evaluated the claim that judges said wines were “high quality” and others evaluated the claim 
that judges said wines were “low quality.” 
In Experiment 1a photos promoted the truth of  positive claims, but not negative 
claims. In Experiments 1b-c we addressed alternative explanations by altering and 
manipulating attributes of  the materials. In Experiments 2a-c, we provide support for the idea 
that photos operate by increasing comprehension. In Experiments 3a-b, we show that the 
influence of  these non-probative photos even extends to when people evaluate how wines 
taste.
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Chapter 2
Experiment 1a 
Method
Subjects
Based on our pilot work, we determined a sample size of  160. We recruited a total of  
167 subjects from Mechanical Turk3. These subjects were on average 33.23 years old (SD = 
12.46)4.
Design
We used a 2 (Photo: photo, no photo) x 2 (Claim: high quality, low quality) mixed 
design with Claim as the between subjects factor.
Procedure
We developed a set of  30 fictitious wine names by pairing adjectives and nouns 
selected from the MRC Psycholinguistic database (Wilson, 1988). The adjectives were 
familiar, and selected from the upper 50% of  the MRC familiarity scale (“yellow”; M = 
536.36, SD = 62.23; scale = 100-700). We also selected nouns that fell 0.5 SD below the mean 
of  the familiarity scale (“rick”; M = 195.20, SD = 53.47; scale M = 488, scale SD = 99), while 
avoiding nouns with an obvious relation to wine (wine, grapes, vineyards). We chose these 
unfamiliar nouns because photos should have more room to help people comprehend 
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3 Mechanical Turk and the survey platform we used (Qualtrics) interact in such a way that it is possible to collect 
data from more subjects than requested: some subjects go directly to the experiment on Qualtrics, but never 
formally accept the job with Amazon—apparently because they forget to do so. In Experiments 1a-b and 2a-b 
we aimed for 80 observations per between subjects cell. In Experiment 2c we aimed for 100 observations per cell 
to increase our power to detect correlations. In Experiment 1c, there were fewer photo trials per subject so, to 
increase precision, we increased the number of  observations to 100 per between subjects cell. In Experiment 3a, 
we aimed to increase precision, and thus boosted sample size. In Experiment 3b, we recruited as many subjects 
as we could, given constraints on funds, the length of  the semester, and our allocation from the departmental 
subject pool.
4 We recorded subjects’ age in all experiments reported in this thesis. We did not record gender in all 
experiments, but report that information when available. Our Mechanical Turk samples were restricted to 
people that were over the age of  18 and living in the United States. 
information people do not already understand. Using Google, we found no evidence that any 
of  the fictitious wines existed as products (for the list of  wine names, see Appendix A).
We used Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) to present instructions and 
materials in subjects’ web browsers. Subjects read a cover story that described a California 
wine competition in which a panel of  experts rated wines as either “high quality” or “low 
quality.” Then we told subjects they would see a series of  wines names from this competition, 
and that some of  the wine names would appear with a photo and others would appear alone 
(see Figure 1). When each wine name appeared on the screen, subjects judged whether a 
claim about the wine was true or false. Some subjects judged the positive claim, “This wine 
was rated as high quality,” and other subjects judged the negative claim, “This wine was rated 
as low quality.” We told subjects to respond by selecting either a “True” or a “False” button 
within three seconds, or as quickly as possible otherwise. To illustrate what they would see 
during the experiment proper, we showed subjects the wine name Lazy Ape with and without a 
photo.
When wine names appeared with photos, the photos depicted the noun in the wine 
name: for instance, the name Yellow Rick appeared with a photo of  a haystack. For names 
comprised of  adjectives that were colors or numbers, we selected photos with the same color 
or number the adjective described (Yellow Rick appeared with a photo of  a yellowish rick). 
Figure 1. Example of  a wine name with and without a photo. Photo credit: 
Fir0002/Flagstaffotos, Creative Commons license.
21
 
Figure 1 shows how subjects saw wine names and photos. Wine names appeared in a random 
order, counterbalanced to appear with and without photos equally often, and wine names 
were counterbalanced to appear in the top or bottom half  of  the browser window. A third of  
the wine names appeared with photos, and two thirds appeared alone. We chose this relatively 
low proportion of  photos because fluency effects tend to be largest when there are few fluent 
relative to disfluent items (Westerman, 2008).
After the experimental phase ended, we asked subjects questions to identify those who 
may have failed to pay attention or comply with the experimental instructions. First, we told 
subjects to read a short (five paragraph) article about how the shape of  a wine glass affects the 
taste of  wine, and to decide if  the photo in the article (of  a glass of  wine) was appropriate to 
help boost understanding. Four paragraphs in, the article explained to subjects that we were 
actually only interested in whether they are paying attention. Then we told subjects what the 
“secret word” was, and asked them to enter that word on the following page of  the survey. 
Subjects who produced the secret word passed this attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009). Then we asked subjects whether they had maximized their web browser, 
used their “back” or “refresh” button, completed the experiment in a single session, engaged 
in other tasks, spoke to others, worked in an environment free of  noise and distraction and 
without help, or had used a search engine to look up the wine names. To encourage truthful 
responding, we told subjects that we would fully compensate them for participating regardless 
of  their responses to these questions.
Results & Discussion
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In all experiments, subjects who failed our measures of  compliance5 did not change 
the overall pattern of  results, so we included all subjects in the analyses reported. There were 
no other exclusion criteria.
To what extent did photos promote the truth of  positive and negative claims? To 
answer this question, we calculated the proportion of  times subjects responded true to the 
claims, grouped those proportions according to whether wine names appeared with photos or 
alone, and grouped them again according to whether subjects evaluated the “high quality” or 
the “low quality” claim. We display those results in Figure 2. As the figure shows, photos led 
subjects to respond true more often to the “high quality” claim, but less often to the “low 
quality” claim. We then calculated raw effect sizes by taking the difference in the proportion 
of  times subjects responded true in the photo versus no photo trials. Photos produced a raw 
effect size of  0.12, 95% CI [0.07, 0.17] for the “high quality” claim, and -0.08, 95% CI 
[-0.12, -0.03] for the “low quality” claim. In null hypothesis terms 6, there was a Photo x 
Claim interaction, F(1, 165) = 34.72, p < .01.
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5 We recorded these failure rates for only the experiments that used the Mechanical Turk subject pool. In 
Experiment 1a, the percentage of  subjects who failed the attention check was 32. In Experiments 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 
2c, and 3a the percentage was 43, 39, 35, 47, 42, and 31 respectively. These failure rates are above or at the high 
end of  those reported research that has investigated Mechanical Turk as a subject pool (10-34%; Goodman, 
Cryder, & Cheema, 2012; Kapelner & Chandler, 2010). We suspect those high rates are an artifact of  the 
attention check we used. The article people read was five paragraphs long, and came at the end of  the 
experimental task when subjects would be most fatigued and tempted to skim or skip the material presented (see 
Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, & Cranor, 2010). Second, although the theme of  the article was related to the theme 
of  the experimental task, reading an article about wine is different from judging whether a claim about wine is 
true. An attention check more similar to the main experimental task may have produced lower failure rates, and 
provided more useful information for determining whether subjects paid attention.
6 Our statistical analyses focus on estimates of  effect sizes and the precision with which those effects were 
measured. Presenting data with effect sizes and confidence intervals supports recent efforts to move people away 
from thinking about effects dichotomously (as significant or not) and towards thinking about how big those 
effects are, and how certain one can be of  their size (Cumming, 2012, 2014). For that reason, we present our 
primary statistics as effect sizes and confidence intervals, though we include relevant null hypothesis tests in the 
text and tables.
These findings fit with the idea that photos increased comprehension of  wine names, 
boosting their conceptual fluency—a feeling people interpreted as a evidence wines were high 
quality. Indeed, photos even decreased true responses to the “low quality,” in line with 
people’s tendency to interpret fluency positively even when a task focuses them on negative 
attributes of  targets. In one experiment, for instance, people saw high contrast (perceptually 
fluent) shapes and low contrast (perceptually disfluent) shapes; some people judged how 
“pretty” the shapes were, others judged how “ugly” the shapes were. Regardless of  how the 
judgment was framed, people evaluated fluent shapes more positively—as “more beautiful” 
and “less ugly”—than disfluent shapes (Reber et al., 1998; see also, Seamon et al., 1998). Our 
findings are conceptually similar. Regardless of  whether subjects got the “high quality” or 
“low quality” version of  the claim, photos led them to evaluate wines more positively.
But another explanation for these patterns is that seeing photos next to wine labels 
encourages people to mentally graft the photos onto the labels, and to speculate that good 
companies not only make good wines, they also put more effort into the design of  their 
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Figure 2. Proportion of  “true” responses to the “high quality” and “low quality” claims when wine 
names appeared with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the 
photo/no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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packaging. Could this less intriguing explanation have produced our results? To address this 
question, in Experiment 1b we removed the generic wine labels so that the subjects saw wine 
names written in black font against a white background. 
Experiment 1b
Method
Subjects
We recruited a total of  164 subjects from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on 
average 27.76 years old (SD = 9.19).
Design & Procedure
The design and procedure followed that of  Experiment 1a, except that we removed 
the generic wine labels so that the slides depicted only a wine name (written in black Gill Sans 
font) and (in a third of  trials) a photo against a white background.
Results & Discussion
As Figure 3 shows, photos produced the same pattern of  results as in Experiment 1a, 
leading subjects to respond true more often to the “high quality” claim, but less often to the 
“low quality” claim. That is, photos produced a raw effect size of  0.11, 95% CI [0.07, 0.16] 
for the “high quality” claim, and -0.08, 95% CI [-0.13, -0.04] for the “low quality” claim. In 
null hypothesis terms, there was a Photo x Claim interaction, F(1, 162) = 33.12, p < .01. 
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Of  course, removing the generic wine labels might make people less inclined to 
engage in reasoning about the quality of  a company, but it would not prevent them from 
doing so. Thus, to further examine this counter explanation, in Experiment 1c we replaced 
some photos with a black square, but told subjects a photo was hidden behind each square. If  
people use a “photo means quality” rule, then even the “hidden” photos should produce 
results similar to those of  Experiments 1a-b. But if  people use photos to comprehend the 
wine names, photos should wield their effects only when their semantic content is visible. 
Experiment 1c 
Method
Subjects
We recruited a total of  235 subjects (124 females, 83 males, and 28 subjects who did 
not report their gender7) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 34.30 years 
old (SD = 12.06).
PhotoPhoto
“High quality” “Low quality”
No Photo No Photo
Figure 3. Proportion of  “true” responses to the “high quality” and “low quality” claims when wine 
names appeared photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the 
photo/no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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7 Our demographics measures came at the end of  the experiment. Some subjects exit the survey before getting 
to these measures; those subjects make up the missing values reported here.
Design & Procedure
The design and procedure followed that of  Experiment 1b, with a few exceptions. 
First, the type of  images subjects saw were photos or “photos behind boxes,” making the 
design a 2 (Type of  Image: photo, box, no photo) x 2 (Claim: high quality, low quality) mixed 
design with Claim as the between subjects factor. This design change also meant that one 
third of  wine names appeared with photos, one third with boxes, and one third alone. 
Second, we told subjects they would not see all of  the photos, but that instead sometimes 
photos would be hidden behind a black box. Specifically, after explaining that some wine 
names would appear with photos, and others alone, instructions read “But there is a twist: you 
will not actually see all of  the photos. Instead, sometimes photos will be hidden behind a 
black box.” 
In a replication attempt, we changed the images so that the boxes did not cover the 
entire photo as a way of  encouraging subjects to believe the photos were really there. The 
boxes covered enough of  the photos so that the semantic information was obscured, while 
leaving a thin edge of  the photos visible. Because a few photos had black backgrounds, their 
edges not appear visible behind the black boxes. So we used gray boxes and changed the 
experimental instructions accordingly.
Results & Discussion
As Figure 4 shows, photos again led subjects to respond true more often to the “high 
quality” claim, and less often to the “low quality” claim. By contrast, boxes exerted only a 
trivial influence on how subjects responded. In other words, photos produced a raw effect size 
of  0.10, 95% CI [0.05, 0.14] for the “high quality” claim, and -0.09, 95% CI [-0.15, -0.04] 
for the “low quality” claim; boxes produced a raw effect size of  0.02, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.07] for 
the “high quality” claim, and -0.04, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.01] for the “low quality” claim. In null 
hypothesis terms, there was a Type of  Image x Claim interaction, F(2, 232) = 14.06, p < .01. 
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We replicated these patterns with a group of  university subjects, and a second group 
of  Mechanical Turk subjects who saw the “gray box” version of  the experiment. To arrive at 
a more precise estimate of  the size of  these effects, and those reported in Experiments 1a-b, 
we conducted random effects model mini meta analyses 8 and report those results, which are 
consistent with those reported here, in Table 1 (Cumming, 2012). 
Photo Box No Photo Photo Box No Photo
“High quality” “Low quality”
Figure 4. Proportion of  “true” responses to the “high quality” and “low quality” claims when wine 
names appeared with photos, boxes, or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals 
for the photo/box/no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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8 These mini meta analyses derive an estimated effect size and its confidence interval based on each replication 
of  the effect, with relatively larger samples exerting more influence over the estimate. We used a random effects 
model because of  problems inherent in fixed effect models. Fixed effect models assume that each study measured 
the same population effect size and therefore do not take heterogeneity of  the experiments into account. For that 
reason, fixed effect models tend to yield confidence intervals that are too narrow to account for the variance 
across samples. Random effects models, by contrast, do take heterogeneity in account, and in doing so provide a 
more realistic confidence interval for heterogenous samples. In fact, random effects analyses will produce the 
same result as fixed effects analyses when there is no heterogeneity, so there is no concern that using random 
effects with a homogenous sample would yield inaccurate estimates (Cumming, 2012).
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Photos wielded a stronger influence when they were visible, a finding at odds with the 
idea that people use a “photo means quality” rule. Instead, the findings fit with a conceptual 
fluency mechanism, which would require people to access the semantic content from photos 
to bring related information to mind and comprehend the wine names. 
But an equally plausible explanation is that seeing the interesting, colorful images in 
photos makes wines more aesthetically pleasing, and something about that aesthetic appeal 
makes wines seem higher quality. Perhaps people would use that rule explicitly, reasoning that 
pretty photos signal quality wines. The same outcome could also occur without relying on an 
explicit rule: we know that people can mistake positive feelings associated with attractiveness 
as evidence information is familiar (Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool, & Garcia-Marques, 
2013; Monin, 2003). If  aesthetically appealing photos increased feelings of  familiarity, that 
also could lead people to evaluate wines more positively (Zajonc, 1968).
Yet if  photos work through such a route, they should exert their effects to a similar 
extent regardless of  whether they increase comprehension. By contrast, if  photos operate by 
increasing comprehension they should exert their strongest effects when they can most 
increase comprehension—when people evaluate claims about wines with unfamiliar names, 
such as Yellow Rick compared to wines with familiar names, such as Scarlet Apple. We examined 
this hypothesis in Experiments 2a-c by showing subjects wine names comprising unfamiliar 
nouns (as in Experiment 1) versus familiar nouns. 
Experiment 2a
Method
Subjects
We recruited 158 subjects (62 females, 89 males, and 7 subjects who did not report 
their gender) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 31.20 years old (SD = 
12.11).
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Design
We used a 2 (Photo: photo, no photo) x 2 (Claim: high quality, low quality) x 2 
(Familiarity: familiar names, unfamiliar names) mixed design, with Claim manipulated 
between subjects.
Procedure
Using the method described in Experiment 1, we developed a set of  30 familiar wine 
names, all featuring nouns high in familiarity (nouns at least 0.5 SD above the mean, such as 
“apple”; M = 571.20, SD = 25.65; scale M = 488, scale SD = 99; see Appendix A). Subjects 
saw a set of  60 wine names including the 30 new familiar wine names plus the 30 unfamiliar 
wine names used in Experiment 1. The presentation of  familiar and unfamiliar wine names 
was random. The procedure was otherwise identical to that of  Experiment 1a.
Results & Discussion
Figure 5 shows three important findings. First, the pattern from Experiments 1a-c 
replicated. For unfamiliar wine names, photos promoted the truth of  the “high quality” claim, 
but not the “low quality” claim. Second, in line with our hypothesis, photos exerted stronger 
effects when they could most increase comprehension (but as the figure shows, only for the 
positive claim). Third, a closer look at the patterns on both the “high quality” and “low 
quality” sides of  the figure suggests that even in the absence of  photos, subjects turned to 
what was easier to comprehend—the familiar wine names. The figure also shows raw effect 
sizes, confidence intervals, and (in null hypothesis terms) a Photo x Claim x Familiarity 
interaction, F(1, 156) = 7.37, p < .01. 
To arrive at more precise estimates of  the size of  these effects, we conducted random 
effects model mini meta analyses and report those results, which are consistent with those 
reported here, in Table 1 (Cumming, 2012).
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These findings suggest photos exert their strongest effects when they can most increase 
comprehension and that even in the absence of  photos, comprehension per se promotes 
positive evaluations. We reasoned that if  it is true that photos increase comprehension while 
people evaluate claims, then subjects should be able to demonstrate that increased 
comprehension at the end of  the experiment. That was the purpose of  Experiment 2b.
Experiment 2b
Method
Subjects
We recruited 186 subjects (100 females, 67 males, and 19 subjects who did not report 
their gender) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 32.75 years old (SD = 
11.71).
Design & Procedure
The design and procedure were similar to that of  Experiment 3a, except that 
immediately after judging the truth of  claims, we showed subjects nouns from wine names 
they had encountered and asked them to classify each noun into one of  five categories.  We 
defined the five categories for subjects as an object, something people make; a food, even if  it 
is a plant; an animal; a plant, but one that people would not typically eat; and a geographical 
location, something you could walk to or visit. We told subjects to choose the one best 
category that each word fit into, and that if  they were unsure they should go with their best 
guess. Subjects did this categorization task for the 16 nouns they had most recently 
encountered. We relied on only these most recent items because they should be easiest for 
subjects to remember, boosting our chances of  detecting increases in comprehension. Nouns 
appeared one at a time in a random order, and the five categories along with their definitions 
appeared as options below each noun. Eight of  the nouns were familiar, the other eight were 
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unfamiliar. For each type of  noun, four had earlier appeared with photos and four had earlier 
appeared alone.
Results & Discussion
We replicated the patterns from Experiment 2a. But our primary interest was the 
extent to which photos help people comprehend familiar and unfamiliar nouns. To that end, 
we calculated the proportion of  nouns subjects classified correctly, and display those results in 
Figure 6. As the figure shows, photos increased comprehension for unfamiliar nouns but not 
for familiar nouns. For unfamiliar nouns photos produced a raw effect of  0.08, 95% CI [0.03, 
0.13], but for familiar nouns photos produced a raw effect of  -0.02, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.02]. In 
null hypothesis terms, there was a Familiarity x Photo interaction, F(1, 185) = 9.96, p < .01.
These findings provide converging evidence that photos work by making wine names 
easier to comprehend. Indeed, the findings suggest that while subjects evaluated the claims 
about wines, photos increased subjects’ ability to comprehend the unfamiliar nouns. And it 
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Figure 6. Proportion of  correct categorizations for unfamiliar and familiar nouns that appeared with 
photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the photo/no-photo effect 
(see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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Unfamiliar nouns Familiar nouns
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was those wine names for which photos boosted comprehension that they most promoted 
positive evaluations. 
It should also be possible to demonstrate with these data that the more photos helped 
subjects comprehend unfamiliar nouns, the more they led subjects to say the “high quality” 
claim was true. To investigate this possibility, we calculated the photo effect on truth for the 
subset of  unfamiliar wine names that subjects later saw the nouns of  in the comprehension 
test. We also calculated the photo effect on comprehension for those same nouns. Then we 
measured the extent to which the photo effect on truth was related to the photo effect on 
comprehension. We found no evidence of  a relationship, a correlation of  -0.03, 95% CI 
[-0.23, 0.17]9. In null hypothesis terms, for the “high quality” claim when subjects saw 
unfamiliar nouns there was no relationship between the effect of  photos on truth and 
comprehension, p > .05.
These patterns may seem at odds with a comprehension mechanism. After all, how 
much photos help people comprehend nouns should predict the extent to which photos lead 
people say positive claims are true. But on second thought, this mechanism does not require 
photos to increase people’s actual comprehension. Rather, it only requires that photos 
increased people’s feelings of  comprehension—how much they feel they know what words 
mean, accurate or not. To further examine this comprehension mechanism, in Experiment 2c 
we measured the extent to which photos made subjects confident they knew the meaning of  
the nouns in wine names.
Experiment 2c 
Method
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9 We ran these same analyses with the “low quality” claim and the familiar nouns and found no significant 
relationships. We report the statistics for only the “high quality” claims using unfamiliar nouns given that the 
photo effect consistently appears under those conditions. We used robust analyses (iteratively re-weighted least 
squares, or IRLS) to account for potential effects of  outliers in the dataset. The analysis re-weights data points 
with unusually large residuals, minimizing their influence and producing a more precise estimate of  the 
relationship between variables. When we ran a Pearson’s product-moment correlation we found the same 
correlation of  -0.03, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.17], p > .05. 
Subjects
We recruited 226 subjects (133 females, 72 males, and 21 subjects who did not report 
their gender) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 33.78 years old (SD = 
11.47).
Design & Procedure
The design was the same as that of  Experiment 2a. The procedure was similar, except 
that after judging a claim about each wine name, subjects rated how confident they were they 
knew what the noun in the wine name meant. For example, after judging a claim about Yellow 
Rick, we asked subjects “How confident are you that you know what “rick” means?” Subjects 
responded on a scale from 0 = “Not at all confident” to 100 = “Totally confident.” 
Results & Discussion
We again replicated the main findings from Experiments 2a-b. But we were primarily 
interested in how confident subjects were that they knew what nouns in wine names meant 
when those wine names appeared with photos versus alone. To answer that question, we 
calculated the mean confidence rating subjects gave to nouns, grouped those means according 
to whether wine names appeared with photos or alone, and grouped them again according to 
whether wine names were comprised of  familiar or unfamiliar nouns.
As Figure 710 shows, photos increased subjects’ confidence that they knew what 
unfamiliar nouns meant; photos trivially increased subjects’ confidence they knew what 
familiar nouns meant. In other words, for the unfamiliar nouns, photos produced a raw effect 
of  13.25, 95% CI [11.20, 15.31]; for familiar nouns, photos produced a smaller raw effect of  
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10 The within subjects confidence interval calculations we used pool the variance of  all within subjects factors 
(Masson & Loftus, 2003). But because the variance for “familiar nouns” condition was extremely low, including 
it in the calculations for “unfamiliar nouns” condition would have yielded inappropriately small confidence 
intervals. We therefore took a more conservative approach, calculating the confidence intervals for the photo/no 
photo effect separately for unfamiliar and familiar nouns. In the main text we also present confidence intervals 
on the difference between the photo and no photo conditions.
0.96, 95% CI [0.34, 1.59]. In null hypothesis terms, there was a Familiarity x Photo 
interaction, F(1, 225) = 143.51, p < .01.
Moreover, we found evidence that subjects’ tendency to say the “high quality” claim 
was true was positively related to the extent to which photos made subjects confident they 
knew what nouns meant, a correlation of  0.27, 95% CI [0.10, 0.43]11. In null hypothesis 
terms, for the “high quality” claim there was a positive correlation between the truth effect 
and the confidence effect, p < .05.
Considered together, Experiments 1 and 2 show that non-probative photos promote 
the truth of  positive claims, but not negative claims. Moreover, the findings from Experiment 
2 fit with the idea that photos work by increasing comprehension. Not only did photos exert 
their strongest effects when they could most increase comprehension (Experiments 2a-c), 
photos increased actual comprehension (Experiment 2b) and subjective feelings of  
Photo No Photo Photo No Photo
Unfamiliar nouns Familiar nouns
Figure 7.  Average ratings for how confident people were that they knew what unfamiliar and familiar 
nouns meant when wine names appeared with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals for the photo/no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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11 As in Experiment 2b, we report the statistics for only the “high quality” claims using unfamiliar nouns, and 
used robust analyses to account for potential effects of  outliers in the dataset. When we ran a Pearson’s product-
moment correlation we found a weaker correlation of  0.18, 95% CI[0.00, 0.35], p < .05.
comprehension (Experiment 2c). And the extent to which photos increased people’s subjective 
feelings of  comprehension was related to how much photos led subjects to think the positive 
claim was true (Experiment 2c).
Nonetheless, it is one thing to demonstrate that photos influence what people think 
happened in some fictitious wine competition, but it would be quite another to show that 
photos influence what people think about a wine once they actually taste it. Yet photos might 
do exactly that: if  photos boost conceptual fluency, they should exert their influence whenever 
people interpret the resulting feelings as relevant to the task at hand—even if  people believe 
the photos themselves are irrelevant (Higgins, 1998; Schwarz, 2004). The photo of  the rick, 
then, should lead people to think Yellow Rick wine tastes good, even if  they believe the photo 
would do no such thing. 
We examined this idea in Experiment 3a-b in three ways. First, we determined 
whether people actually think photos would affect how they judged the taste of  wines. 
Second, before testing whether photos affect actual judgments of  taste, in Experiment 3a we 
replicated the patterns using the scenario from Experiments 1 and 2 but asked subjects to 
suppose that they themselves had tasted the wines; that is, subjects imagined the taste of  wines 
that appeared with photos or without photos. Third, in Experiment 3b we examined whether 
photos affect how people think wines actually tasted by having subjects taste wines that 
appeared with photos or alone.
We first gathered evidence for our assumption that people believe photos have little 
effect on how wines taste. 
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Table 2
Means and standard deviations for subjects’ responses to the question about how much each factor would affect 
how wines tasted
Factor M (SD)
Being able to pronounce the wine name 1.86 (1.10)
The font used to write the name of  the wine 2.16 (1.12)
Seeing a photo on its label 2.22 (1.08)
Understanding all the words in the name of  the wine 2.26 (1.24)
Knowing what color it was 3.15 (1.19)
Knowing how much the wine costs 3.16 (1.29)
Having a friend tell you it was good 3.31 (1.20)
Whether you had tried it before 3.49 (1.33)
Smelling the wine 3.84 (1.05)
We told 55 Mechanical Turk subjects12 to suppose they were tasting a wine, and asked 
them “How much would each of  the following affect how the wine tasted to you?” Subjects 
responded on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much). As Table 2 shows, subjects thought 
several factors, such as a photo on the label and being able to understand the words in the 
wine name, would have relatively little influence over how wines tasted. Unsurprisingly, they 
thought other factors, such as a friend’s opinion, would exert more influence. 
Next, in Experiment 3a we asked a separate group of  subjects to evaluate claims 
about how wines tasted.
Experiment 3a
Method
Subjects
We recruited 209 subjects (100 females, 91 males, and 18 subjects who did not report 
their gender) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 34.08 years old (SD = 
12.76).
Design & Procedure
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12 There were 26 females, 28 males, and 1 subject who did not report their gender. The average age of  these 
subjects was 30.65 (SD = 11.53).
The design and procedure were similar to that of  Experiment 1a, with two exceptions. 
First, after explaining the wine competition, we told subjects to suppose they had tasted these 
wines at the competition. Second, the claims subjects evaluated referred to the taste of  wines; 
specifically, some subjects judged the truth of  the claim “This wine tastes high quality” and 
other subjects judged the claim “This wine tastes low quality.” 
Results & Discussion
Despite people’s tendency to believe that photos would have relatively little influence 
over how wines tasted, photos continued to exert their effects. Indeed, Figure 8 shows that 
photos produced patterns similar to when, in Experiments 1-2, subjects made the more 
remote decision about how judges evaluated wines. Photos produced a raw effect size of  0.12, 
95% CI [0.08, 0.15] for the “high quality” claim, and -0.08, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.03] for the 
“low quality” claim. In null hypothesis terms, there was a Photo x Claim interaction, F(1, 207) 
= 35.71, p < .01.
Of  course, just because photos influenced hypothetical judgments of  taste does not 
mean they would influence actual judgments of  taste. After all, taste provides people with 
diagnostic, sensory information and diagnostic information tends to trump fluency as 
evidence (Unkelbach, 2007; for a related finding, see Monin, 2003; for a review, see 
Greifeneder et al., 2011). Yet we also know that taste is susceptible to cognitive biases. People’s 
tendency to remember and prefer what they encounter first affects taste judgments 
(Mantonakis, Rodero, Lesschaeve, & Hastie, 2009). And tangential features of  a wine can 
change how people experience its taste; wines taste better when people think they are more 
expensive, and when the wine’s sponsor seems congruent with the product (Becker, van 
Rompay, Schifferstein, & Galetzka, 2011; Clemente, Dolansky, Mantonakis, & White, 2013; 
Plassman O’ Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 2008; for a review, see Krishna, 2012).
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What is more, recent evidence suggests that comprehending words while tasting would 
change how people experience taste. When people saw familiar words while tasting a drink in 
which sweetness was difficult to detect, they more often reported experiencing sweetness in 
the drink, compared to when people saw less familiar words. One explanation for this pattern 
is that familiar words were more conceptually fluent, and the positive feelings they produced 
led people to experience taste in line with that feeling (Liang, Roy, Chen, & Zhang, 2013). 
This possibility fits more broadly with people’s tendency to judge ambiguous information in 
line with their current expectations, beliefs, or feelings (Carmichael, Hogan, & Walter, 1932; 
Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Nickerson, 1998). 
Combining these findings suggests that by helping people comprehend wine names, 
photos should alter people’s subjective experience of  how those wines taste. To examine that 
possibility, in Experiment 3b we asked subjects to taste wines that appeared with photos or 
alone.
Experiment 3b 
Figure 8. Proportion of  “true” responses to the “tastes high quality” and “tastes low quality” claims 
when wine names appeared with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence 
intervals for the photo/no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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Method
Subjects
We recruited 121 students (54 females, 67 males) from Brock University (Canada). 
These subjects were on average 23.74 years old (SD = 5.27).
Design & Procedure
The design and procedure departed from that of  Experiment 3a in four ways. First, 
because the IRB (Institutional Review Board, or ethics committee) decision limited subjects to 
consuming no more than 90 mL of  wine (just under one standard drink), we reduced our set 
of  wine names to six, and for each wine name subjects tasted 15 mL of  wine. The IRB 
decision also led us to maximize power by pairing half  the wine names with photos, rather 
than a third. Second, subjects completed the experiment seated at a tasting station. In front of 
them was a computer and the wines arranged from left to right, numbered 1 through 6. 
Subjects learned they would taste each wine in order and were instructed to sip water 
between tastings. What subjects did not know was that we adopted a method used in wine 
tasting research, and served the identical wine (a Pinot Noir from the same producer and 
vintage; see Mantonakis et al., 2009), a fact we concealed by pouring wines in black glasses. 
Third, just before each wine name appeared on the screen, instructions prompted subjects to 
pick up, swirl, smell, and taste the wine. While tasting, subjects saw the wine name and 
decided whether the claim “This wine tastes high quality” was true or false. We included only 
the positive version of  the claim to further maximize power. Finally, after the experiment, we 
asked questions to determine whether subjects knew all of  the wines were actually the same 
(What did you think of  the wines?, Did you like them?, and Great, which one was your favorite?).
Results & Discussion
Did photos change how subjects judged the taste of  wines? As Figure 9 shows, the 
answer is yes. 
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Subjects said the claim “This wine tastes high quality” was true more often when wine 
names appeared with photos compared to alone. Photos produced a raw effect size of  0.08, 
95% CI [0.01, 0.16]. In null hypothesis terms, there was an effect of  photos, t(120) = 2.19, p 
= .03. Although 12% of  those subjects thought the wines were the same, excluding them from 
the analysis produced the same pattern of  results, a raw effect size of  0.10, 95% CI [0.02, 
0.19], t(105) = 2.53, p = .01. Note that although the confidence intervals are reasonably wide, 
more plausible values are concentrated around the mean (Cumming, 2012). 
In Experiment 3b, identical wines tasted better when they appeared with photos, 
suggesting photos trumped diagnostic sensory information about taste. Considered together, 
Experiments 3a-b also fit with the idea that even though people believe photos are irrelevant 
to the task at hand, photos exert their influence by producing feelings that seem relevant.
Photo No Photo
Figure 9. Proportion of  “true” responses to the “tastes high quality” claim wine names appeared with 
photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the photo/no-photo effect 
(see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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Chapter 3
In eight experiments we examined the extent to which non-probative photos promote 
the truth of  positive and negative claims. Across all experiments, photos that depicted nouns 
in wine names—but that otherwise had nothing to do with wine—selectively promoted the 
truth of  related positive claims. We found evidence consistent with the idea that photos 
exerted these effects by helping people comprehend wine names, and that photos even swayed 
people’s judgments about the taste of  wines.
In Experiment 1a, photos led people to think the claim that wines were “high quality” 
was true, but did not lead people to think the opposite “low quality” claim was true. This 
finding fits with other effects in which adding context or priming related ideas makes 
information feel more conceptually fluent, and people mistake that feeling as evidence for 
positive (but not negative) evaluations (Belke et al., 2010; Reber et al., 1998; Seamon et al., 
1998; Topolinski et al., 2009; Whittlesea, 1993; for reviews, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Reber et al., 2004; Winkielman et al., 2003). 
But an alternative explanation was that people simply responded on the basis of  a rule 
associating photos with quality. People might have reasoned that good companies put more 
effort into designing their packaging and would therefore have used photos more often than 
bad companies. Several of  our findings work against that explanation. First, photos promoted 
positive evaluations in Experiment 1b even when we removed the generic wine labels that 
could have encouraged people to consider what a wine’s packaging signaled about its quality. 
Second, in Experiment 1c, telling people there was a (hidden) photo did not make wines seem 
higher quality, suggesting it was not enough for people to know there was a photo associated 
with the wine, people actually had to see those photos. 
Although that pattern fits with the idea that photos operated by helping people 
comprehend wine names, there was another reason people might have needed to see photos 
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for those effects to emerge. Perhaps photos were aesthetically pleasing, and that aesthetic 
pleasure produced positive feelings people mistook as evidence wines were familiar (Garcia-
Marques et al., 2013; Monin, 2003). That route also could have promoted positive evaluations  
and would not have required photos to boost comprehension to do so.
Nonetheless, several of  the findings from Experiments 2a-c were at odds with that 
possibility. In each of  those experiments, photos exerted stronger effects when wine names 
were made up of  unfamiliar nouns, suggesting a mechanism related to comprehension. And 
when we actually measured comprehension in Experiment 2b, we found that photos 
increased comprehension for unfamiliar nouns more than for familiar nouns. Perhaps that 
result is not all too surprising, given that photos can aid understanding (Carney & Levin, 
2002; Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Henkel, 2012; Mayer & Gallini, 1990). But it suggests that 
at the time people evaluated the claims, photos boosted comprehension most for the same 
wine names they also most increased positive evaluations. 
Similar patterns arose in Experiment 2c when, after people evaluated each wine, we 
measured how confident they were that they knew what each noun in the wine name meant. 
Moreover, there was a relationship between people’s subjective comprehension and positive 
evaluations; the more photos made people feel that they knew what words meant, the more 
they promoted the truth of  the positive claim. 
Finally, Experiments 2a-c also showed that even in the absence of  photos, people 
turned to what they could comprehend, responding more positively when wine names were 
familiar. That pattern fits with work showing that people prefer stimuli they have repeatedly 
encountered, and suggests people’s judgments were prone to sources of  comprehension other 
than photos—familiarity (Bornstein, 1989; Jacoby et al., 1988; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; 
Zajonc, 1968). 
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Together, Experiments 1 and 2 revealed two important findings. Photos promoted 
positive evaluations and exerted their strongest effects when they could most increase 
comprehension—results consistent with the idea that photos cause feelings of  conceptual 
fluency that people use as evidence for positive evaluations (Reber et al., 2004; Topolinski et 
al., 2009; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2006). 
Such a mechanism suggests it is not the photos that are important, but the boost in 
conceptual fluency they afford (see Newman et al., 2012). In line with that idea, in 
Experiments 3a-b we demonstrated that even though people tend to believe photos are 
irrelevant for judging the taste of  wines, photos nonetheless influenced those judgments. In 
Experiment 3a, photos promoted positive evaluations about the hypothetical taste of  wines. 
But the results of  Experiment 3b are perhaps more intriguing: photos also produced that 
pattern when people actually tried the wines and therefore could have drawn on more 
diagnostic information (its taste) to evaluate the claims. This finding meshes well with recent 
work showing that comprehending words while tasting can change how people experience 
taste (Liang et al., 2013). And the findings fit more broadly with people’s tendency to perceive 
ambiguous information in line with their current expectations, beliefs, or feelings (Carmichael 
et al., 1932; Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Nickerson, 1998). 
Theoretical implications
As a whole, the set of  findings blend well with the large body of  literature showing 
that people draw on cognitive feelings that arise when information comes to mind easily, and 
do so even when those feelings are irrelevant to the task at hand (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Higgins, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). This bias arises 
because people are tuned into correlations between their cognitive feelings and states of  the 
world that usually help them make decisions quickly and accurately (Damasio, 1994; 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Halberstadt, 2009; Halberstadt & Catty, 2008; Unkelbach, 
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2006, 2007). But as with any rule of  thumb, every so often people’s feelings lead them into 
error (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; 
Whittlesea, 1993). We see our findings as an instance of  one of  those errors: by providing 
semantic context, photos produced irrelevant feelings people assumed were relevant, and 
people used those feelings to evaluate the merit of  claims.
Another interpretation of  how semantic context boosts positive evaluations
Recall from the introduction that one way semantic context promotes positive 
evaluations is by making the targets people are evaluating come to mind more easily, 
producing feelings of  conceptual fluency that people interpret as evidence targets are positive 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz, 2004; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). But a 
common feature of  the targets in each of  the studies we described (a picture of  a key, a claim 
about a turtle, or the word “boat”) was that they represented ideas or objects people are 
familiar with—concepts people know fairly well, that they would have encountered many 
times (Newman et al., 2012; Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman et al., 2003. 
But being reminded for the twenty-thousandth time about keys, turtles, or boats is not 
the same as realizing for the first time that a rick is a haystack13. The photo of  the haystack 
does more than help you bring to mind established concepts (haystacks, and your related 
knowledge): it also helps you learn a new concept (rick). Perhaps learning that a rick is a 
haystack was another reason photos led people to see Yellow Rick in a positive light. Such a 
possibility would qualify claims that semantic context promotes positive evaluations by 
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13 In one version of  the experiment that used unfamiliar wine names, we compared how long it took people to 
respond to the claims when they had just seen a photo, or had not just seen a photo. Seeing photos just before 
the wine names appeared did not speed people’s response times, consistent with the idea that photos would not 
help people access unfamiliar concepts, such as “rick.” We did not gather these data for the familiar wine names, 
but theories of  spreading activation and the cognitive fluency literature predict that for known concepts, 
semantic context would speed response times (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman et al., 
2003). Thus, our finding coupled with these predictions are consistent with the proposition that different 
processes occur when photos provide semantic context for known versus unknown concepts.
facilitating people’s access to known concepts. It may also do so by teaching people new 
concepts. And several lines of  research bolster that interpretation. 
We know that learning or solving problems can be pleasurable. In one study, when 
people successfully used contextual information to learn new words, areas of  the brain 
associated with reward processing were more active (Ripolles et al., 2014). In another study, 
dogs behaved as though they were happier when they solved problems to reap rewards, as 
opposed to when they passively received those rewards (McGowan, Rehn, Norling, & Keeling, 
2014). And learning or problem solving can be especially pleasurable when it occurs rapidly
—as when people experience “Eureka,” or rush of  insight (Lakshmanan & Krishnan, 2011; 
Pronin, Jacobs, & Wegner, 2008; Schilling, 2005; Topolinski & Reber, 2010). Therefore, 
learning from a photo that a rick is a haystack could have increased positive feelings. 
Other research suggests people could have mistaken those feelings from learning as 
evidence the wine was good. In one study, people said words out loud and decided whether 
they saw those words in an earlier phase of  the experiment. People were more likely to call 
words “old” if  they were real (bottle) versus made up (culse). More to the point, people were 
more likely to call made-up words “old” if, when pronounced, those words corresponded to 
real words (phrawg = frog; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Put differently, realizing what words 
meant seemed like evidence for people’s unrelated decisions about whether words were old. 
Likewise, realizing what “rick” meant could have seemed like evidence for people’s decisions 
about the quality of  wine.
Similar work shows that people can mistake their experience of  solving a problem as 
evidence for unrelated judgments. People prefer products more if  just before viewing those 
products they solve an unrelated anagram (Kronlund & Bernstein, 2006). Solving unrelated 
anagrams also increases people’s confidence in the answers to trivia claims (Bernstein, 
Whittlesea, & Loftus, 2002). One way to explain these effects is that solving the anagrams was  
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easier than people expected, and people misinterpreted their ability to solve the problems as 
being “about” their preference for a product or their confidence in an answer (see Whittlesea 
& Williams, 1998, 2001a, 2001b). In a similar vein, learning what unfamiliar wine names 
meant might have served as problems people solved with the help of  photos, an experience 
interpreted as evidence for the quality of  wines.
Finally, the idea that photos operated by increasing learning overlaps with work 
showing that people can misread feelings of  familiarity as evidence that they know something 
(such as knowing the answer to a problem, or knowing a concept well enough to remember it 
for a test; Rawson & Dunlosky, 2002; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Schwartz 
& Metcalfe, 1992; Yue, Castel, & Bjork, 2012; Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 2008). Given that the 
causes and consequences of  familiarity can be bidirectional, a reasonable assumption is that 
people would also misread the feeling that they know something as evidence it is familiar 
(Garcia-Marques et al., 2013; Monin, 2003). These connections help explain how learning a 
word from a photo could seem relevant for decisions that have nothing to do with assessing 
learning: if  photos produce feelings of  knowing, people might mistake those feelings for 
familiarity which—due to its many positive connotations—seems like evidence relevant for 
the task (Carpenter & Olson, 2012; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
The idea that learning promotes positive evaluations raises questions for future 
research. One question is whether learning new concepts would promote positive evaluations 
even when what people learn is clearly unrelated to the target of  evaluation. Suppose people 
saw the wine Yellow Rick, but rather than learning that a “rick” is a haystack, they learned that 
an “aster” is a type of  flower, or some other piece of  unrelated trivia. 
If  we ignore the role of  learning, then a reasonable prediction is that the unrelated 
semantic context would make it more difficult for people to access related knowledge, causing 
Yellow Rick to “feel” less positive, and therefore failing to promote positive evaluations (Collins 
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& Loftus, 1975; Winkielman et al., 2003). Indeed, in a recent study when people saw trivia 
claims paired with unrelated semantic context (such as a claim about turtles with a photo of  a 
lamp) that semantic context did not lead people to think claims were true (Newman, Garry, 
Unkelbach, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2014; see also, Belke et al., 2010; Lee & Labroo, 2004; 
Winkielman et al., 2003). But considering the role of  learning suggests those patterns may not 
hold when the unrelated semantic context helps people learn new concepts (such as when the 
definition of  “aster” appears with Yellow Rick). Under those conditions, the positive effects of  
learning could work against or overshadow the negative effects of  unrelated semantic context.
Do the effects of  learning depend on people making sense of  new concepts 
themselves, as opposed to merely being told the new concepts? We suspect the answer is yes 
because having to grapple with what words mean would allow for an element of  surprise at 
being able to “solve the problem” (see Bernstein et al., 2002; Kronlund & Bernstein, 2006). 
And the more people are surprised by their cognitive feelings—that is, when they strongly 
contrast against ongoing cognitive operations—the more noticeable and influential those 
feelings are (Dechene et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2008; Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & 
Williams, 1998, 2001a, 2001b). So although feeding people the meaning of  “aster” might 
promote positive evaluations, we place our bets on when people extract that meaning 
themselves.
To what extent do photos operate by causing feelings of  conceptual fluency? 
Although we found evidence consistent with the idea that photos operate by causing 
feelings of  conceptual fluency, there are several ways future research could further examine 
that idea. For a start, it would be useful to know whether photos cause positive feelings at all.  
One way to investigate that question is to measure people’s automatic facial muscle responses. 
If  photos produce feelings of  conceptual fluency they should activate muscle responses 
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associated with positive affect (the “smiling” muscles; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; 
Topolinski et al., 2009; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2006). 
Those measures could also provide insights about the role of  learning. When photos 
relate to familiar concepts (such as “apple”) they should cause positive affect. But when photos  
relate to unfamiliar concepts (such as “rick”), and allow people to learn something new, they 
might produce a different pattern of  responses: perhaps the disfluency of  unknown concepts 
produces negative affect, followed by more positive affect when people resolve what those 
concepts mean (for a similar idea, see Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Such a trajectory of  
affective responses would support the hypothesis that facilitating learning promotes positive 
evaluations through a route different to facilitating access to known concepts. 
Another way to examine whether photos operate by producing seemingly relevant 
feelings of  conceptual fluency is by using manipulations that lead people to see those feelings 
as irrelevant. One of  those manipulations is giving people a phony explanation as to what 
caused their feelings. Recall the study where a researcher asked people about their life 
satisfaction on days the weather was nice or poor (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). When the weather 
was nice, people reported being more satisfied with their lives. But that effect disappeared 
when the researcher called attention to the weather (by asking specifically about the weather, 
or saying the research examined how weather influenced moods). In other words, when 
people thought their good mood was due to the weather, they no longer thought those feelings  
were relevant for evaluating their life satisfaction (see also, Oppenheimer, 2004; Schwarz, 
Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer, & Simons, 1991; for a review, see Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
If  photos work by producing feelings of  conceptual fluency that people assume are relevant, 
then calling into question the relevance of  those feelings should diminish the effects of  photos. 
A related way to diminish the effects of  photos is to ask people to analyze reasons for 
their decisions. Analyzing reasons reduces the extent to which people use their feelings as 
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information (including cognitive feelings associated with fluent processing)—an effect thought 
to occur because reasoning focuses people on seemingly more relevant or easier-to-articulate 
information, and shifts people toward processing information more analytically (Halberstadt 
& Catty, 2008; Halberstadt & Green, 2008; Halberstadt & Hooton, 2008; Wilson et al., 1993; 
Wilson & Schooler, 1991; for a review, see Halberstadt, 2009). 
Finally, although people’s default interpretation of  fluency is that information is 
positive (familiar, favorable or true), there is evidence that people can learn the opposite 
interpretation (Unkelbach, 2006, 2007). Suppose we gave people a training phase where they 
saw no photos but instead learned that fluency (perhaps created via color contrast or semantic 
priming) is associated with negative stimuli. Then, during a subsequent phase people would 
evaluate targets, such as wine, that appear with related photos or alone. If  photos operated by 
increasing conceptual fluency, then arming people with the interpretation that fluency is 
negative should cause photos to promote negative evaluations, not positive evaluations.
Understanding the mechanisms behind “truthiness”
 Our findings mesh well with prior work showing that non-probative photos can make 
trivia claims seem more true, promoting what Newman et al. (2012) called “truthiness.” In 
that work, people saw a series of  trivia claims, such as “Macadamia nuts are in the same 
evolutionary family as peaches,” and decided whether the claims were true or false. When 
trivia claims appeared with related photos (of  macadamia nuts), people more often said those 
claims were true. That finding has clear parallels with ours. Just like the photo of  the rick, the 
photo of  macadamia nuts was non-probative because it did not reveal whether the claim was 
true. But it would have provided context that helped people bring related thoughts and 
images to mind, producing feelings of  conceptual fluency people used as evidence for the 
claim. 
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Our findings help rule out an alternative explanation Newman et al. (2012) proposed: 
that people simply mined photos for details that confirmed their default bias to think claims 
are true (Gilbert et al., 1993; Newman et al., 2012; Nickerson, 1998). This mining strategy 
predicts that photos would operate independently of  whether claims are about positive or 
negative attributes of  targets; either way, people would find details in photos that confirm the 
claims. But in our experiments photos did not do that. Instead, they led people to think 
positive claims were true, a finding that fits better with a conceptual fluency explanation.
Still, our pattern of  results is puzzling when up against one of  Newman et al.’s studies 
in which photos of  celebrities promoted the truth of  claims that those celebrities were “alive” 
and that those celebrities were “dead.” Assuming aliveness and deadness are positive and 
negative attributes of  celebrities, those findings do not square with ours. 
One explanation for this discrepancy is that the context of  Newman et al.‘s task 
encouraged people to construe claims about celebrities not in terms of  their positive and 
negative attributes, but more generally as facts about the world. If  so, people might have been 
biased to interpret feelings of  conceptual fluency as evidence of  accuracy or truth (see Kelley 
& Lindsay, 1993; Reber & Schwarz, 1999). By contrast, the evaluative nature of  our task may 
have been more obvious, encouraging people to consider positive and negative attributes of  
wines, and biasing people to interpret fluency as evidence of  preference or quality (see Reber 
et al., 1998; Winkielman et al., 2003). These speculations fit with people’s tendency to impose 
on fluency the most plausible interpretation, given the context of  the task (Greifeneder et al., 
2011; Jacoby et al., 1989; Schwarz, 2004; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013).
A second explanation involves the extent to which people thought the details in 
Newman et al.’s photos versus our photos were appropriate for a mining strategy. People 
might use a mining strategy when photos contain details that could be be plausibly construed 
as evidence for hypotheses inherent in the claims, but rely on their feelings when photos 
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contain seemingly useless details. For example, if  a celebrity looked old or was wearing 
outdated clothing, those details might seem like evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
celebrity was dead. But applying that strategy in our experiment may have seemed much less 
sensible. Perhaps it was too farfetched for people to believe that a detail from a photo of  a 
haystack is evidence for judging not a haystack, but a wine. In that way, our materials may 
have made feelings seem more viable by limiting the extent to which people could mine, or 
thought it reasonable to do so14. When people draw on the content of  photos, versus feelings 
they produce, is a question worthy of  future research.
Practical implications
The most obvious practical implication our findings have is that helping people make 
sense of  product names (by adding related images, or using familiar words) should make those 
products seem better (see Labroo, Dhar, & Schwarz, 2007; Lee & Labroo, 2004). Foreign 
products, such as the French wine Le Chat Noir, might benefit from images on their labels (of  a 
black cat) that reveal what those foreign words mean. 
It would also be useful to know when in the real world photos would stop wielding 
their influence. Do photos continue to exert their effects when people choose from among 
many products, or sample the taste of  different products (see Iyengar & Lepper, 2000)? The 
opportunity to compare features could provide people with diagnostic information (price, 
brand name, prior experience) that seems more relevant than their feelings (Monin, 2003; 
Unkelbach, 2007). Indeed, the comparison process itself  could obscure people’s reliance on 
feelings by leading people to evaluate products more analytically (Halberstadt, 2009). 
Alternatively, overwhelming people with so many options to choose from might make for a 
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14 We cannot rule out the possibility that people used a mining strategy coupled with feelings of  conceptual 
fluency. For positive claims, mining and positive feelings would work together to make the claim seem true. But 
for the negative claim, mining would work against positive feelings, making the claim seem less false than it may 
have if  feelings operated on their own. Future research could have people rate positive and negative targets on a 
scale (say, from 1 = low quality to 6 = high quality). Doing so would remove hypotheses inherent in the claims, 
and potentially reduce people’s bias to confirm claims, while allowing for photos to promote positive evaluations.
difficult task, depleting people’s cognitive resources and leading them to resort to a simpler 
decision strategy—such as what “feels” right (or people may even defer choosing; Greifeneder 
et al., 2011; Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007). 
The practical implications of  our findings extend to other domains, such as education. 
Consider the illusion of  comprehension, when people feel they know information when they 
actually do not (Jacoby, Bjork, & Kelley, 1994). One way to promote this illusion is by making 
it feel easy for people to think about information they are studying (Metcalfe & Dunlosky, 
2008; Rawson & Dunlosky, 2002; Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). Could 
photos that do not teach people new information, but that merely remind people of  what they 
already know, also promote that illusion? Imagine a scientific passage about how plants 
reproduce; embedded in the passage is a generic photo of  a plant. The photo would not 
illustrate processes involved in plant reproduction, but should help students bring related 
information to mind—a feeling students might interpret as evidence they “get” the material 
and can invest less effort studying it (Kornell & Bjork, 2007; see Serra & Dunlosky 2010). 
In fact, because fluency can signal that more effortful cognitive operations are not 
necessary for a task, photos should also increase people’s susceptibility to misleading 
information and increase logical errors (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Song & 
Schwarz, 2008a). It is the malleable meaning of  ease that suggests our findings should apply 
to a number of  people’s other every day decisions (Schwarz, 2004). Photos should make travel 
destinations seem closer, food recipes easier to execute, stocks more valuable, and a person’s 
writing more intelligible (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006, 2008; Oppenheimer, 2006; Song & 
Schwarz, 2008b). And because people tend to conclude personal experiences happened when 
it feels easy to bring related thoughts and images to mind, photos should even quickly lead 
people to believe claims about their personal pasts (Jacoby et al., 1989; Johnson, Hashtroudi, 
& Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008; Whittlesea, 1993). We examined that hypothesis in Part 2.
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Part 2
Chapter 1
Suppose you and your friend are headed home from the zoo. She tells you she took 
many great photos, but regrets that she did not take one when you fed the shoebill. But you 
do not remember feeding a shoebill, and your attempts at remembering are stymied because 
you are not even sure what a shoebill is. And so, hoping to jog your memory, your friend 
Googles “shoebill” and shows you the photo in Figure 1. 
 The photo does not depict you feeding the animal, making it non-probative with 
respect to your friend’s claim. Instead, it merely makes you realize that a shoebill is a large 
bird-like creature—an epiphany that is not all too surprising, given that photos aid 
comprehension and encourage inferences (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Carney & Levin, 
2002; Henkel, 2012; Mayer & Gallini, 1990). 
 Of  course, realizing that a shoebill is a bird is a far cry from remembering that you 
actually fed one. But perhaps having its appearance in mind would be enough to make you 
feel as though you are “thinking back” to feeding it: you “see” its dark feathers, long beak, 
Figure 1. A photo of  a shoebill. Photo credit: Jeff  Whitlock, Creative Commons 
license.
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and large eyes. These thoughts and images may not reflect what you truly experienced, but 
might they nonetheless quickly lure you into believing you remember? And would they also 
quickly lure you into believing you remember an experience that never really happened—if, 
for instance, your friend’s claim about you feeding the shoebill was actually false? We 
examined those questions in this part of  the thesis.
Non-probative photos affect memories and beliefs
We know that non-probative photos can over time lead people to report that they 
remember having experiences that never really happened. In one study, people were more 
likely to remember being involved in a suggested, but false, childhood prank (putting a slimy 
toy in their teacher’s desk) if  they saw a photo that related to but did not depict that prank (a 
photo of  classmates from that grade; Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004; see also, 
Blandon-Gitlin & Gerken, 2010). 
Non-probative photos might have created these false memories in the way Lindsay et 
al. (2004) suggested: by helping people bring to mind related thoughts and images (say, about 
their long ago friends, teacher, and classroom) that people mistook as evidence of  genuine 
experience. Even though the information gathered from the photo offered no proof  the event 
occurred, it should have made it easier for people to speculate about how it could have. 
Perhaps people imagined what they wore that day, who helped them pull the prank, and the 
look of  shock on their teacher’s face. The source of  those thoughts and images would have 
faded, but would nonetheless have come to mind with such detail and ease that people felt like 
they were remembering a genuine experience (see also, Garry & Gerrie, 2005; Wade, Garry, 
Read, & Lindsay, 2002).
Such a mechanism fits with the source monitoring framework, which proposes that 
when the thoughts and images people bring to mind have characteristics that match those 
expected of  genuine experience, people will conclude that they are indeed thinking back to an 
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experience that really happened, not one that was imagined (Johnson, 2006; Johnson, 
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Lindsay, 2008; Lindsay, 2014; Mitchell 
& Johnson, 2000). What characteristics do people expect of  thoughts and images derived 
from genuine experiences, compared to imagined ones? That they have relatively more 
perceptual and contextual detail, lack evidence of  effortful cognitive operations typical of  
having fabricated events, and feel relatively effortless to bring to mind (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Indeed, a large body of  research shows that when 
thoughts and images that come to mind have those characteristics, and to a degree consistent 
with how much time has gone by since the event, people tend to believe they are thinking 
back to an experience that actually happened (Finke, Johnson, & Shyi, 1988; Henkel, 
Franklin, & Johnson, 2000; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Johnson, Foley, & Leach, 1988). 
More often than not this strategy fares well: by exploiting the fact that detail and ease 
correlate with real world experience, people can accurately distinguish thoughts and images 
that result from an event that occurred in real life versus in one’s own head (Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1993). But this strategy leads people astray when 
imagined thoughts and images are too similar to reality—as when a photo of  old classmates 
makes an event come to mind with more detail and less effort than would be expected if  it 
had been imagined (Lindsay et al., 2004). Those thoughts and images may have been so 
similar to ones people expected of  reality that people concluded they were remembering a 
real experience, even though they were not (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson et al., 1993). 
Taken together, this literature suggests a route through which the photo of  the shoebill 
could lead you to believe you fed it. Realizing a shoebill is a bird helps you “see” the details of 
the event and makes it easier to bring related thoughts and images to mind. And although 
that mental picture may provide no proof  the experience happened, you might nonetheless 
feel as though you are remembering.
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Still, that hypothesis suggests non-probative photos can cause these errors swiftly—in 
as much time as it takes for your friend to say you fed the shoebill, and the few seconds you 
spend viewing the photo and contemplating the event. But photos might need more time to 
wield these effects in order to capitalize on factors that increase your confusion as to the 
source of  the thoughts and images you have in mind. 
Repetition, elaboration, and the passage of  time
There are several reasons to suspect the effects of  non-probative photos would be tied 
to the passage of  time, particularly because of  the opportunities for repetition, elaboration, 
and mistakes about the source of  thoughts and images time affords. Consider the Slime study 
(Lindsay et al., 2004). People did not just view a photo from their grade one class and 
remember immediately (in a matter of  seconds) that they had put the slime toy in their 
teacher’s desk. Instead, the process was much more drawn out than that. People came to 
remember the childhood prank over the course of  a week, during which they were 
encouraged to view the photo repeatedly and to elaborate on details of  the event (see also, 
Blandon-Gitlin & Gerkens, 2010; Brown & Marsh, 2008). These other factors (repetition, 
elaboration, and the passage of  time) matter because they should combine to make it 
especially difficult for people to distinguish thoughts and images derived from real experience 
from those generated using photos (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008, 2014).
Take repetition: it reduces the effort needed for people to retrieve (and recognize) 
information, which makes remembering feel less effortful and therefore more like what people 
expect when thinking back to an event that really happened (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Unkelbach, 2006). In fact, we know that repeatedly viewing photos can encourage false 
beliefs. In one study, people saw several photos of  unfamiliar campus locations that they were 
unlikely to have visited before. Several days later, people saw those photos again mixed among 
other photos they had not seen, and decided how likely they were to have visited each 
59
 
location. People thought they were more likely to have visited locations they had previously 
seen in photos (Brown & Marsh, 2008; see also, Henkel, 2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). Put 
differently, repeatedly viewing photos made unlikely experiences seem more likely. 
Repetition wields similar effects alone, without photos. In another study, people 
performed some actions and imagined performing others; later, people again imagined 
performing actions zero, one, or five times. After two weeks, people decided which actions 
they had performed and which they had imagined. The more times people had imagined an 
action, the more likely they were to mistakenly claim that they had actually performed it 
(Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003; see also, Goff  & Roediger, 1998; Seamon, Philbin, & 
Harrison, 2006; Thomas & Loftus, 2002; Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996; see Henkel, 2004 for a 
demonstration that repeatedly retrieving information about an event also blurs the lines 
between what was seen versus imagined). Repetition has these effects because it reduces the 
effort needed to bring information to mind while increasing its vividness; those changes make 
imagined events more similar to reality, increasing confusion as to whether events were 
imagined or real (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Seungas & Johnson, 1988). 
Moreover, encouraging people to elaborate on events exacerbates that confusion by 
adding detail to imagined thoughts and images, making their features even more similar to 
those derived from reality. For example, in the study just described, people received one of  
two types of  instructions for imagining actions. One group of  people was instructed to merely 
imagine performing the actions (“Imagine kissing the frog”), and another group was instructed to 
elaborate on what they were imagining (“Imagine kissing the frog...imagine the color of  the 
frog...imagine the feel of  the frog against your lips”). People who elaborated were more likely to 
conclude that imagined actions had actually been performed (Thomas et al., 2003; see also, 
Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008; Drivdahl & Zaragoza, 2001; Garry, Manning, Loftus, & 
Sherman, 1996; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Sharman, Manning, & Garry, 2005). Combined, 
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these findings suggest that repeatedly viewing non-probative photos while imagining and 
elaborating on details of  the event would make people especially likely to end up 
remembering experiences that never happened. 
And we know that the passage of  time would only make things worse. Over time, 
memories fade, making it more difficult for people to identify the source of  thoughts and 
images, causing increased confusion as to what caused them (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913; Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978; for a review see Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007). It may be, for 
instance, that when people first viewed the photo of  their classmates they were well aware 
that the thoughts and images they brought to mind were mere speculations about how the 
event unfolded. But the passage of  time would have obscured that fact, leaving people with no 
reason to suspect those thoughts and images represented anything other than reality (for 
example, Chrobak & Zaragroza, 2008; see also, Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Henkel & 
Mattson, 2011).
Clearly, repetition, elaboration, and the passage of  time would contribute to how non-
probative photos affect memories and beliefs. But are those factors necessary? That is, must 
you bring the photo of  the shoebill home with you, take the time to view it repeatedly and 
elaborate on its details, and only then, after all that time has gone by, mistakenly conclude 
that you fed the animal? There are reasons to believe the answer is no. The photo should 
exert similar effects much more rapidly—in a matter of  seconds.
Immediate consequences of  non-probative photos
The source monitoring framework supports the idea that non-probative photos should 
work rapidly, without repetition or much time for elaboration. As long as photos can produce 
thoughts and images with characteristics similar enough to those expected when retrieving a 
real experience, they should immediately fool people into believing they are reflecting on 
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reality (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008; see also, Hyman & Kleinknect, 1999; Mazzoni, 
Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). Two related lines of  evidence suggest photos would do exactly that.
The first line of  evidence suggests that by providing semantic context, photos should 
make related information feel easier to bring to mind and cause people to think an experience 
happened. In one study, people saw several lists of  words; after each list, people’s task was to 
decide whether a target word was in the list. When target words (boat) appeared in highly 
related sentence fragments (The stormy seas tossed the), people more often thought those words 
had been in the list, compared to when target words appeared in loosely related sentence 
fragments (He saved up his money and bought a; Whittlesea, 1993). The highly related sentence 
fragments were non-probative because they did not reveal whether target words had actually 
been shown. But they should have made it feel surprisingly easy to bring those words to mind
—a feeling people interpreted as evidence words felt familiar, and must therefore have been 
on the list (Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b).
A second more recent line of  evidence suggests that non-probative photos can exert 
similar immediate effects when people try to remember events from long ago. People read 
news headlines that described true events (“John Paul sainthood process begins”) and false 
events (“Blair under fire for botched Baghdad rescue attempt: Won't step down”) that had 
happened several years before and decided within a few seconds whether they remembered 
each event. People claimed to remember both true and false news events more often when 
headlines appeared with related but non-probative photos, such as a head shot of  Tony Blair 
at a podium, compared to no photo (Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011). Much like 
the highly related sentence fragments, the related photos might have made thoughts and 
images about news events come to mind more easily, which people interpreted as evidence 
they were remembering those events.  
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But one difference between the experiment using highly related sentence fragments 
and the news headlines experiment is that in the news headlines experiment people were 
probably under the assumption that each headline was true, given that a few false events were 
embedded among many true ones (Strange et al., 2011). This matters because if  people 
already believed the false events were actually true, that could have bolstered the credibility of 
related thoughts and images that came into mind, making photos more powerful than they 
would otherwise have been (Nickerson, 1998). Nevertheless, other work shows that non-
probative photos should have similar effects even without suggestion. When people judged a 
series of  trivia claims they knew were a mix of  true and false, pairing those claims with non-
probative photos quickly made people more likely to think the claims were true (Newman, 
Garry, Bernstein, Kantner, & Lindsay, 2012). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that if  photos help people bring related 
information to mind, they should immediately make people more inclined to think 
experiences happened. The photo of  the shoebill should therefore quickly lure you into 
thinking you fed the animal.
Personally experienced, recent events
We know from the headlines study that non-probative photos can make people feel as 
though they are remembering specific personal experiences that happened long ago (Strange 
et al., 2011). But it is not obvious that photos would also exert these effects for experiences 
that happened not so long ago—such as when, right after leaving the zoo, you saw a photo of  
the shoebill and wondered whether you fed it.
Why should the time since an experience has gone by matter? Because compared to 
older experiences, more recent experiences typically contain more detailed records about 
what happened and require very little effort to bring to mind (Johnson et al., 1988; Johnson et 
al., 1993). This extreme detail and ease could thwart the effects of  non-probative photos for 
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two reasons. First, if  you actually had just fed the shoebill, the remembered thoughts and 
images would be compelling by themselves, making the ones you gather from the photo pale 
in comparison. Second, even if  you had not just fed the animal, and so nothing much came to 
mind, because the event supposedly just occurred you might expect thoughts and images to 
come to mind with more ease and detail than the photo can muster. For recent experiences, 
then, people’s bar for accepting thoughts and images as evidence of  reality may be too high 
for photos to clear.
Such an idea fits with work showing that when people can accurately recall details of  
their experiences, it can be harder to distort their memories for those details. We know, for 
example, that people are less susceptible to misleading suggestions and the effects of  repeated 
exposure if  they had paid full attention to an event compared to if  their attention had been 
divided (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; Johnson, 2006; Lindsay, 2008; Zaragroza & 
Lane, 1998). And the same can be said of  other non-diagnostic feelings that arise during 
retrieval. For example: although people can mistake positive feelings that arise from viewing 
attractive faces as evidence those faces have been encountered before, people tend to avoid 
that mistake when they encode faces well enough to remember details that discriminate ones 
they saw from ones they did not (Monin, 2003). 
Of  course, the idea that superior memories are protected from the influence of  non-
diagnostic feelings suggests that inferior memories are not. Thus, non-probative photos should 
affect people’s judgments about recent experiences, as long as people’s memories are hazy. 
Some evidence for this idea comes from the study using highly related sentence fragments. 
People in that study had to think back to a very recent experience (a list of  words they had 
just seen seconds ago). The list of  words was presented so rapidly that it would have been too 
difficult for people to remember whether they had seen the target words (an idea supported by 
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people’s poor accuracy rates; Whittlesea, 1993). But poor recollection is probably what 
opened the door to the influence of  the sentence fragments.
There is also evidence non-probative photos wield more powerful influences over 
judgments for which people are uncertain—ones that they cannot draw on their memory to 
answer—as when people evaluate trivia claims for which they lack relevant background 
knowledge (such as “Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches” 
compared to easier claims such as “Everest is the tallest mountain”; Newman et al., 2012). 
Parallel effects arise when it comes to other non-diagnostic feelings. Although printing trivia 
claims in easy-to-read high color contrast usually leads people to think those claims are true 
(“Orsono is in Chile”; Reber & Schwarz, 1999), color contrast loses its influence when the 
answers to the claims are obvious (“Paris is in France”; Unkelbach, 2007). Combined, these 
findings hint that non-probative photos should wield their effects over personally experienced 
recent events as long as people cannot remember much about those events. 
Now reconsider the zoo trip. Even though it just happened, consulting your memory 
failed to turn up details about feeding the shoebill. And you had no clue what a shoebill was, 
so you struggled to bring related thoughts and images to mind that would help you speculate 
about the event. The photo relieved that struggle, producing a feeling of  ease that bore 
resemblance to feelings you usually get when thinking back to real experiences. And so you 
would probably have concluded the event happened, even if  it did not.
Overview of  experiments
Across six experiments, we examined the extent to which non-probative photos 
immediately lead people to think recent personal experiences happened. To do so, we showed 
people the names of  several unfamiliar animals (such as shoebill). During a study phase, 
people saw the animal names and “interacted” with the animals on a computer (for example, 
in some studies people pretended to “give food to” or “take food from” each animal). Then, 
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during a later test, we showed people the animal names again, except this time half  the 
animal names appeared with a photo of  the animal and half  appeared alone. When each 
animal name appeared on the screen, people evaluated whether a claim about their earlier 
experience (such as “I gave food to this animal”) was true or false. 
In Experiment 1, when people judged the claim “I gave food to this animal,” photos 
made people more likely to say the claim was true. In Experiments 2a-c, we found that these 
effects generalized to other claims (“I fed this animal,” and “I gave healthy food to this 
animal”). But, as in Part 1, we also found that the valence of  the claims mattered. Photos led 
people to say claims about their positive experiences were true, but not their negative 
experiences. Finally, in Experiments 3a-b, we found evidence that photos cause similar 
patterns when people guessed about other people’s pasts, and that photos wielded their 
strongest effects when they could most help people bring related thoughts and images to 
mind.
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Chapter 2
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects
Based on our pilot work, we determined a sample size of  100. We recruited a total of  
8915 Victoria University of  Wellington undergraduates, who participated in exchange for 
course credit. These subjects were on average 18.82 years old (SD = 1.24).
Design 
We used a within subjects design, manipulating whether test items appeared with 
photos or alone.
Procedure
All instructions appeared on a computer, and each subject individually completed two 
phases: a study phase and a test phase.
Study phase. During the study phase, we told subjects they would see names of  various 
zoo animals appear on the computer screen, and their task was to pretend to give food to 
some of  the animals and take food from others. We created this list of  40 unfamiliar animals 
(see Appendix B) by searching the internet for unusual animals; we used unfamiliar animals 
because the effects of  non-probative photos tend to be more powerful for judgments about 
unfamiliar stimuli (see Part 1; see also, Newman et al., 2012). These 40 animals were a mix of 
mammals, reptiles, fish, and birds. 
We normed these items in two ways. First, we gathered data on how easily people 
could imagine the animals. We showed 83 Mechanical Turk subjects each animal name, one 
at a time, and asked them “How easily can you form a mental image of  this animal?” 
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15 We recruited as many subjects as we could, given constraints on funds, the length of  the semester, and our 
allocation from the departmental subject pool. In Experiments 2a-c, we aimed to increase precision by collecting 
200 observations per between subjects cell. Experiment 3a-b used a different design that we suspected (based on 
its similarity to the designs used in Part 1) would require fewer subjects per between subject cell. 
Subjects answered using a scale from 1 = “Very difficult” to 7 = “Very easy.” The mean rating 
was 1.56 (SD = 1.34, Median = 1), supporting our hunch that people struggle to picture these 
animals. Second, we examined whether people felt they could bring to mind thoughts and 
images about animals better with photos compared to without. Accordingly, a separate group 
of  34 Mechanical Turk subjects saw the animal names appear one at a time; half  the animal 
names appeared with a photo of  the animal, half  appeared alone. We told subjects that when 
each animal name appeared on the screen their job was to rate how easy it felt to bring to 
mind information related to the animal. Subjects responded on a scale from 1 = “Extremely 
difficult” to 6 = “Extremely easy.” In line with the idea that photos of  animals increase the 
ease of  bringing related information to mind, subjects gave higher ratings when animal 
names appeared with photos (M = 3.01, SD = 1.37) compared to alone (M = 1.54, SD = 
0.57); that is, photos produced a raw effect size of  1.47, 95% CI [1.05, 1.88], t(33) = 7.16, p 
< .0116. 
When subjects started the study phase, animal names appeared one at a time on the 
computer screen along with an instruction that subjects should either give food to or take food 
from the animal (such as “Give food to the Shoebill” and “Take food from the Hammerkop”). 
Animal names appeared randomly, counterbalanced to be paired equally often with the “give 
food” and “take food” instruction. Next to the computer were two objects: a brown paper bag 
(the “food bowl”) and a small white dish (the “feed bag”), each of  which contained dried 
beans. When an instruction to give food appeared on the screen, subjects were to pick up a 
bean from the feed bag and move their hand forward to put the bean in the food bowl; when 
instructions to take food appeared on the screen, subjects were to pick up a bean from the 
food bowl and move their hand backward to put the bean in the feed bag. Finally, instructions  
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16 At the same time that we gathered these norms, another group of  subjects made the same ratings for 40 
familiar animals (such as zebra; see Appendix B). We report those data in Experiment 3b. 
reminded subjects to pay attention, because later they would answer more questions about the 
animals, though we did not specify the nature of  those questions.
Test phase. After the study phase, subjects completed a 30-second filler task in which 
they counted the number of  dots in an image. Then the second phase, the memory test, 
began. Subjects learned that each animal name would appear on the screen, one at a time, 
like they saw before—but this time, their job was to decide if  the claim “I gave food to this 
animal” was true or false. Subjects also learned that some of  the animal names would appear 
with a photo of  that animal and other animal names would appear alone. Subjects practiced 
associating true responses with the a-key (which was labeled with a T sticker) and false 
responses with the l-key (labeled with an F sticker) with four animal names not used in the 
main experiment. Subjects then completed the test proper at their own pace.  
 Animal names appeared one at a time in a random order in large black font against a 
white background. Half  the animal names appeared with a colored photograph of  the 
animal, and half  appeared alone (see Figure 2). The central object in the photo was the 
animal, but other contextual details (background scenes) were also visible. No photos depicted 
animals eating. Animal names appeared equally often with and without photos and equally 
often with the “gave food” and “took food” study phase instructions. 
Results & Discussion
Figure 2. Example of  an animal name with and without a photo. 
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We checked whether subjects had followed the study phase instructions to “give food 
to” and “take food from” animals by counting the number of  beans left in the food bowl and 
feed bag at the end of  the experiment. If  subjects followed the instructions, there should be 
20 beans in the feed bag and 20 in the food bowl. Although five subjects ended up with the 
wrong number of  beans in their bowl, these subjects did not change the overall pattern of  
results so we included them in the analyses reported. There were no other exclusion criteria
We first examined whether the memory was test sufficiently difficult, such that subjects 
would have to resort to guessing about which experiences they did and did not have. Subjects 
struggled to remember which animals they gave food to and took food from, with accuracy 
rates near chance levels (see Appendix C for d‘ measures of  accuracy across Experiments 
1-2c). The accuracy rates were similar in Experiments 2a-c.
But our primary question is the extent to which non-probative photos can quickly lead 
people to say claims about their experiences are true. To answer this question, we calculated 
subjects’ bias (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) to respond true17. Bias measures the criterion 
subjects set for responding “true” and is derived from the hit rate (the proportion of  times 
subjects respond true to claims that are true) and false alarm rate (the proportion of  times 
subjects respond true to claims that are false). Bias is calculated by converting the hit and false 
alarm rates into z-scores, adding those scores, dividing by two, then multiplying by negative 
one18. Negative values of  bias represent a liberal criterion (a tendency to respond “true”) and 
positive values represent a more conservative criterion (a tendency to respond “false”). 
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17 In the experiments reported in Part 2, we draw the same conclusions whether we analyze bias, or (as we did in 
Part 1) proportion of  true responses. We present signal detection measures because, in addition to measuring the 
extent to which photos change people’s threshold for claiming experiences happened (bias), they also measure 
independently people’s ability to distinguish between experiences that really did versus did not happen 
(sensitivity or discrimination). We used these accuracy measures in the experiments that required people to 
remember events (Experiments 1-2c) in order to gauge the extent to which people were uncertain about which 
experiences really happened. In any case, interested readers can calculate the proportion of  true responses by 
averaging the hit and false alarm rates shown in Appendix C. 
18 The negative multiplier is arbitrary. It is merely the convention in the literature. 
We performed these bias calculations separately for animal names shown with photos 
and animal names shown alone, and display the results in Figure 3. As the figure shows, 
photos led subjects to respond true more often to the claim that they gave food to animals; 
that is, subjects’ bias scores were more negative when animal names appeared with photos 
compared to alone. Indeed, calculating raw effect sizes by taking the difference in subjects’ 
bias to respond true in photo versus no photo trials produced an effect size of  -0.18, 95% CI 
[-0.29, -0.07]. In null hypothesis terms, there was an effect of  photos, t(88) = 3.35, p < .01. 
This pattern of  results fits with the idea that non-probative photos make related 
thoughts and images come to mind more easily, which people immediately mistake as 
evidence of  genuine experience (Johnson et al., 1993; Whittlesea, 1993). If  true, then how 
might photos affect people’s judgments when claims imply that experiences never happened
—if, for instance, the claim people judged involved an inaction, such as “I did not feed the 
shoebill.” 
On the one hand, the association between ease and truth raises the possibility that 
easily bringing information to mind about animals would make any related claim seem to 
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Figure 3. Bias scores for animal names that appeared with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-
subject confidence intervals for the photo/no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
Photo No Photo
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have more merit; if  so, photos should also lead people to say claims involving inaction are 
true (Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach, 2007). On the other hand, ease is also associated 
with familiarity, raising another possibility: easily bringing information about animals makes 
them feel familiar—a feeling at odds with the claim about not having had an experience with 
the animal, and which might therefore steer people away from responding true (Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981; Unkelbach, 2006).
To address this question, in Experiment 2a we changed the study phase so that 
subjects’ task sometimes involved action (“Feed the Shoebill”) and other times involved 
inaction (“Don’t feed the Hammerkop”). Then, during the test phase, some subjects judged 
the claim “I fed this animal,” and others judged the claim “I did not feed this animal.” 
Experiment 2a
Method
Subjects
We recruited 406 subjects from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 
31.63 years old (SD = 11.59).
Design & Procedure
We used a 2 (Photo: photo, no photo) x 2 (Claim Tested: fed, did not feed) mixed 
design, with Photo as the within subject factor and Claim Tested as the between subjects 
factor.
The procedure departed from Experiment 1 in four ways. First, subjects completed 
the experiment online through Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Second, 
during the study phase subjects were instructed to “feed” or “don’t feed” each animal that 
appeared on the screen. When instructions said “feed” subjects were to click a green circle 
that appeared below the instruction, and when instructions said “don’t feed” they were to 
refrain from clicking a red circle. We selected these colors to reduce errors, relying on well-
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known associations: green, the action, and red, the inaction. Subjects practiced responding to 
“feed” and “don’t feed” instructions for four animals not included in the main experiment. 
Third, during the test phase, some subjects responded to the claim “I fed this animal” and 
other subjects responded to the claim “I did not feed this animal” by selecting one of  two 
options that said “true” or “false.” These response options appeared below each animal 
name, counterbalanced (between subjects) to appear on the right- or left-hand side of  the 
screen. 
Finally, after the test phase, subjects were asked to read a six paragraph article about a 
species of  monkey that is going extinct, and to decide whether the photo that appeared with 
the article (a photo of  a monkey) was appropriate to help boost understanding. As in the 
attention check described in Part 1, the fourth paragraph of  the article contained a secret 
word. On the following page of  the survey, subjects were asked to produce that secret word; 
successful subjects passed this attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). 
Then subjects indicated whether they had maximized their web browser, used their “back” or 
“refresh” button, completed the experiment in a single session, engaged in other tasks, spoke 
to others, worked in an environment free of  noise and distraction and without help, written 
any of  the animal names down during the study phase or used a search engine to look up the 
animals. We encouraged truthful responses by promising subjects we would compensate them 
in full regardless of  their answers.
Results & Discussion
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In all experiments, subjects who failed our measures of  compliance19 did not change 
the overall pattern of  results, so we included all subjects in the analyses reported in this and 
subsequent experiments. There were no other exclusion criteria. 
To determine the extent to which photos lead people to respond true to claims 
involving actions versus inactions, we performed the bias calculations described in 
Experiment 1, grouped those data according to whether subjects evaluated the “fed” or the 
“did not feed” claim, and display the results in Figure 4. As the figure shows, photos led 
subjects to respond true more often to the “fed” claim, but not to the “did not feed” claim. 
Indeed, for the “fed” claim photos produced a raw effect size of  -0.22, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.13] 
but for the “did not feed” claim they produced a raw effect size of  -0.06, 95% CI [-0.13, 
0.01]. In null hypothesis terms, there was a Photo x Claim Tested interaction, F(1, 404)= 
Photo No Photo
Figure 4. Bias scores for responses to the “fed” and “didn’t feed” claims when animals names appeared 
with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the photo/no-photo 
effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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19 As in Part 1, we recorded these failure rates for only the experiments that used the Mechanical Turk subject 
pool. In Experiment 2a, the percentage of  subjects who failed the attention check was 38. In Experiments 2b, 
2c, 3a, and 3b the percentages were 38, 38, 45 and 40 respectively. As explained in Part 1, these failure rates are 
higher than those reported research examining the Mechanical Turk subject pool (10-34%; Goodman, Cryder, 
& Cheema, 2012; Kapelner & Chandler, 2010). 
7.08, p < .01. Note that subjects were overall more willing to claim the “did not feed” claim 
was true. We suspect that relates to the difficulty of  the task. Perhaps it was so difficult to 
remember much about the experiences (particularly in the “did not feed” condition, as d’ 
scores in Appendix C show) that subjects were more biased to endorse claims that implied no 
experience with the animals. 
We replicated these patterns with two separate groups of  Mechanical Turk subjects, 
and a group of  undergraduate students. To arrive at a more precise estimate of  the size of  the 
photo bias, we subjected data from all of  these experiments to random effects model mini 
meta-analyses and report those results, which are consistent with those reported here, in Table 
1 (Cumming, 2012). 
Photos did not make people more inclined to say that just any claim was true. Instead, 
they led people to say true only when claims implied that experiences happened. One 
explanation for this pattern is that by making information about animals more easily come to 
95% CI
Experiments included 
in calculating ES CommentsClaim ES LL UL z p
Positive 
(“Fed”) -0.15 -0.22 -0.09 -4.78 <.01
2aᵃ, 2a R1ᵇ, 2a R2ᵇ, 2a 
R3ᵇ
2a R1: same method as 2a
2a R2: same method as 2a, 
but with an undergraduate 
student sample, instead of  a 
Mechanical Turk sample
2a R3: same method as 2a
2b R1: same method as 2b
2b R2: same method as 2b
2b R3: same method as 2b
Positive 
(“Gave food”)
-0.11 -0.15 -0.06 -4.62 <.01 1aᵃ, 2bᵃ, 2b R1ᵇ, 2b 
R2ᵇ, 2b R3ᵇ
Negative 
(“Did not feed”) 0.05 -0.04 0.14 1.04 .30
2aᵃ, 2a R1ᵇ, 2a R2ᵇ, 2a 
R3ᵇ
Negative 
(“Took food”) 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.25 .81
2bᵃ, 2b R1ᵇ, 2b R2ᵇ, 2b 
R3ᵇ
Note. Meta analyses split by claims across experiments 1-2b. ES = effect size, the difference between photo 
and no photo bias means. Negative effect size = a bias to respond “true.” Positive effect size = a bias to 
respond “false.” LL and UL = lower and upper limits of  the 95% CI of  the ES. R = replication of  an 
experiment (R1 = first replication, R2 = second replication, and so on).
ᵃExperiments and replications reported in the main text. ᵇReplications not otherwise reported in the main 
text. 
Table 1
Summary of  results from each meta analysis for Experiments 1-2b
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mind, photos made them feel familiar (see Whittlesea, 1993). And that feeling would have 
seemed more consistent with claims about experience than claims about inexperience. But an 
equally plausible explanation is that ease seemed consistent with the relatively more positive 
experiences about giving animals nutrition (“fed”), compared to the more negative claim 
about not (“did not feed”). 
Indeed, as we explained in Part 1, being able to bring information to mind easily is 
inherently pleasing, and people tend not to draw on that feeling as evidence for negative 
judgments (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; 
Seamon, McKenna, & Binder, 1998; Topolinski, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009; 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006). This 
literature, coupled with the findings from Part 1, suggest photos could have made people feel 
more positively, biasing people to believe they had a positive past with the animal, not a 
negative past.
To examine that possibility, in Experiment 2b we had subjects pretend to give food to 
and take food from animals; that way, during the test phase, subjects judged either a positive 
claim (“I gave food to this animal”) or negative claim (“I took food from this animal”), both of 
which implied having an experience with animals. If  easily bringing information to mind 
implies experience generally, photos should lead subjects to respond true more often to either 
claim. But if  ease implies positive experiences, photos should lead subjects to respond true 
more often only to the “gave food” claim.
Experiment 2b 
Method
Subjects
We recruited 416 subjects from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 
33.16 years old (SD = 12.17).
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Design & Procedure
We used a 2 (Photo: photo, no photo) x 2 (Claim Tested: gave food, took food) mixed 
design, with Photo as a within subject factor and Claim Tested as a between subjects factor.
The procedure followed that of  Experiment 2a with three exceptions. First, the study 
phase instructions explained that subjects were to “give food to” or “take food from” each 
animal. Second, rather than doing the action by clicking on a colored circle, subjects selected 
one of  two options that said “give food” or “take food,” counterbalanced (between subjects) to 
appear first or second. Third, during the test phase, some subjects judged the claim “I gave 
food to this animal” and others judged the claim “I took food from this animal.”
Results & Discussion
As Figure 5 shows, photos led subjects to respond true more often to the positive 
claim, but not to the negative claim. That is, for the “gave food” claim photos produced a raw 
effect size of  -0.16, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.05], but for the “took food” claim they produced a raw 
effect size of  -0.02, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.07]. In null hypothesis terms, there was a trend toward a 
Photo x Claim Tested interaction, F(1, 414)= 3.55, p < .06.
We replicated these patterns with three additional groups of  Mechanical Turk 
subjects. To arrive at a more precise estimate of  the size of  the photo bias, we subjected data 
from all of  these experiments, and data from Experiment 1, to random effects model mini 
meta-analyses (Cumming, 2012). We report those results, which are consistent with those 
reported here, in Table 1. 
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Photos led subjects to respond true more often to claims about positive experiences 
but not to claims about negative experiences. This result meshes well with the findings from 
Part 1 and, more broadly, people’s tendency to interpret ease as evidence for positive but not 
negative judgments (Reber et al., 1998; Seamon et al., 1998). Although it is possible these 
patterns emerged because photos caused positive feelings that matched the positive outcomes 
of  the actions suggested in the claims (giving animals nutrition, as opposed to taking it away), 
a confound clouds that interpretation. Perhaps it was not the outcome of  the action that 
mattered, but the action (giving) itself. 
In fact, we know that actions associated with giving can have positive connotations 
separate from the outcome of  the action. Positive feelings, such as liking, are linked with the 
desire to approach a stimulus (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Elliot, 2006; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). Moreover, physiological responses associated with the desire to 
approach come about when people’s bodies are merely positioned in a way similar to how one 
might approach a stimulus (such as when people lean forward; Price, Dieckman, & Harmon-
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Figure 5. Bias scores for responses to the “gave food” and “took food” claims when animals names 
appeared with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the photo/
no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
Photo No PhotoNo Photo
“Took food”
Photo
“Gave food”
78
 
Jones, 2012). These findings raise the possibility that thinking about actions associated with 
approaching a stimulus (such as moving towards and animal to give it food) produced positive 
feelings that seemed consistent with positive feelings of  ease. 
To address this confound, in Experiment 2c subjects judged one of  two claims that 
both used the word “gave,” but referred to either a positive or negative outcome of  the action. 
Specifically, during the study phase we instructed subjects to “give healthy food” and “give 
unhealthy food” to animals. Then during the test phase some subjects judged the claim “I 
gave healthy food to this animal” and others judged the claim “I gave unhealthy food to this 
animal.” Assuming it is the positive outcome of  the action that matters, and not the action of  
giving, photos should lead subjects to say true more often only to the “healthy food” claim.
Experiment 2c 
Method
Subjects
We recruited 458 subjects (255 females, 155 males, and 48 subjects who did not report 
their gender) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 33.15 years old (SD = 
11.54).
Design & Procedure
We used a 2 (Photo: photo, no photo) x 2 (Claim Tested: healthy food, unhealthy food) 
mixed design, with Photo as the within subject factor and Claim Tested as the between 
subjects factor.
The procedure followed that of  Experiment 2b, except that instructions told subjects 
their task was to give “healthy food” or “unhealthy food” to the animals. We also explained 
what we meant by healthy and unhealthy food. Specifically, we said “You have an assortment 
of  food that the animals can eat. Some of  it is healthy (the people-equivalent of  vegetables) 
and some of  it is unhealthy (the people-equivalent of  donuts or french fries).” This change 
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meant that during the study phase, subjects clicked one of  two options that said “healthy 
food” or “unhealthy food,” and during the test phase some subjects judged the claim “I gave 
healthy food to this animal,” and others judged the claim “I gave unhealthy food to this 
animal.”
Results & Discussion
Figure 6 shows that photos led subjects to respond true more often to the “healthy 
food” claim but not to the “unhealthy food,” suggesting that the patterns from Experiment 2b 
were not tied to the actions associated with the word “gave” but to the outcome of  those 
actions. In other words, for the “healthy food” claim, photos produced a raw effect size of  
-0.18, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.09], but for the “unhealthy food” claim they produced a raw effect 
size of  0.01, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.11]. In null hypothesis terms, there was a Photo x Claim Tested 
interaction, F(1, 456)= 8.69, p < .01.
These findings suggest that it was the outcome of  the action that mattered, not the 
valence of  the word that described that action. But there is one remaining explanation for 
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Figure 6. Bias scores for responses to the “healthy food” and “unhealthy food” claims when animals 
names appeared with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the 
photo/no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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why photos selectively promoted claims about giving food or giving healthy food, but not 
claims about taking food or giving unhealthy food. Could it be that the claims we are calling 
“positive” are actually just describing relatively more plausible events? People may think 
taking food or giving unhealthy food is just generally implausible, suggesting that an 
alternative interpretation of  our results is that photos selectively lead people to believe 
plausible events (see Blandon-Gitlin & Gerkens, 2010). 
One way to address that alternative interpretation is by using subjects’ overall 
willingness to respond true across the conditions as a proxy for the plausibility of  events. 
Returning to the results of  Experiment 2b, Figure 5 suggests that subjects were overall more 
willing to respond true to the claim about giving food, consistent with the idea that giving 
food is more plausible than taking food. But that pattern did not emerge in the results of  
Experiment 2c. Returning to Figure 6 reveals that subjects were just as willing to respond true 
to the healthy food claim as they were to the unhealthy food claim, suggesting the two events 
were equally plausible. Therefore, a plausibility explanation does not account for all of  our 
data.
Instead, considered as a whole Experiments 2a-c suggest non-probative photos 
immediately lead people to think positive experiences happened, but not negative 
experiences. These findings are conceptually similar to those described in Part 1, and fit more 
broadly with research suggesting that if  photos cause feelings of  ease, they should encourage 
more positive judgments, but not negative ones (Reber et al., 1998; Seamon et al., 1998). 
So far we have demonstrated that photos can make it seem as though positive 
experiences happened in one’s own past. Would photos also make those positive experiences 
seem more likely to have happened in other people’s pasts? Such a finding would suggest that 
photos create a general aura of  belief  around positive experiences. But why would that be?
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For one thing, we know that people draw on ease broadly, as evidence not only of  
personal experience, but as evidence of  truth, value, frequency, beauty, closeness, intelligence, 
loudness, and fame (and the list goes on; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006, 2008; Jacoby, Allan, 
Collins, & Larwill, 1988; Jacoby et al., 1989; Oppenheimer, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; 
Reber et al., 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; for reviews, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Jacoby et al., 1989; Schwarz, 2004; Winkielman et al., 2003). Ease can be “about” so many 
different things because the way people interpret it is constrained by what seems to be the 
most plausible cause, given the task at hand (Higgins, 1998; Schwarz, 2004). If  a task 
encourages people to judge loudness, ease seems to be about loudness; if  a task encourages 
people to judge fame, ease seems to be about fame; and if  a task encourages people to judge 
the past (as in Experiments 1-2c), ease seems to be about the past (Jacoby et al., 1989). 
These findings suggest that people would assume feelings of  ease were relevant even if 
people’s task focused them on evaluating other people’s pasts, instead of  their own. In line 
with that possibility, we know that a feeling of  ease can make people more confident that a 
childhood experience happened to them and that the same feeling also makes people more 
confident that those childhood experiences would have happened to other people (Bernstein, 
Godfrey, & Loftus, 2009; Bernstein, Whittlesea, & Loftus, 2002). If  photos increase the ease 
with which related thoughts and images come to mind then they too might continue to exert 
their effects when people make judgments about the experiences of  others. 
To investigate that idea, in Experiment 3a-b, we asked subjects to guess whether other 
people had experiences with the animals at the zoo. Specifically, subjects decided whether 
other people “gave food to” or “took food from” animals that appeared with photos or alone.
Experiment 3a 
Method
Subjects
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We recruited 282 subjects (135 females, 127 males, and 20 subjects who did not report 
their gender) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 30.49 years old (SD = 
11.27).
Design & Procedure
We used a 2 (Photo: photo, no photo) x 2 (Claim: gave food, took food) mixed design, 
with Photo as the within subject factor and Claim as the between subjects factor.
The procedure followed that of  Experiment 2b, except that we removed the study 
phase, and changed the instructions accordingly. Rather than asking subjects to remember 
which animals they gave food to and took food from, we explained that we had instructed 
another group of  Mechanical Turk workers to “give food to” or “take food from” each 
animal. Then we explained that subjects’ task was to decide (between subjects) whether claim 
“The workers gave food to this animal” or “The workers took food from this animal” was true 
or false.
Results & Discussion
To examine the extent to which photos affected people’s judgments about the 
experiences of  others, we calculated for each subject the proportion of  “true” responses, 
grouped those responses according to whether animals had appeared with photos or alone, 
then further grouped them according to whether subjects had judged the “gave food” or 
“took food” claim. We used the “proportion true” measures because the experimental design 
does not afford calculations of  the hit and false alarm rates required for signal detection 
analyses (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). We display the results in Figure 7. 
As the figure shows, when subjects guessed about what experiences other people had, 
photos produced patterns similar to when subjects decided what they themselves remembered 
experiencing (Experiments 1-2c). That is, photos led subjects to respond true more often to 
the positive claim but not the negative claim. For the “gave food” claim, photos produced a 
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raw effect size of  0.30, 95% CI [0.25, 0.36], but for the “took food” claim they produced a 
raw effect size of  -0.06, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.00]20. In null hypothesis terms, there was a Photo x 
Claim interaction, F(1, 280)= 70.86, p < .01. 
Combined with Experiments 1-2c, these findings suggest photos make positive 
experiences seem more believable regardless of  whether those experiences refer to one’s own 
past or to another person’s past. The results are similar to those reported in Part 1, where 
photos also led subjects to think positive claims were true, but not negative claims, and fit with 
the idea that photos work by helping people more easily bring related information to mind. 
But recall an alternative explanation we raised for the patterns in Part 1: aesthetically 
pleasing photos could cause feelings people mistake for familiarity, which would also  
encourage positive judgments (Garcia-Marques, Mackie, Claypool, & Garcia-Marques, 2013; 
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No Photo No Photo
Figure 7. Proportion of  “true” responses to the “gave food” and “took food” claims when animals names 
appeared with photos or alone. Error bars show 95% within-subject confidence intervals for the photo/
no-photo effect (see Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
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20 Note that these effect sizes are larger than those reported in Experiments 1-2c, as can be seen by comparing 
them to the average of  the hits and false alarms shown in Appendix C. Our speculation for this difference is that 
in the “memory” experiments (Experiments 1-2c), people could at least attempt to draw on their memories to 
evaluate the claims; that is, people had a source of  information other than photos (however poor their memories 
were; Monin, 2003; Unkelbach, 2007). By contrast, in the “no memory” experiments (Experiments 3a-b) people 
have only the photos as a source of  information, allowing photos to wield more power. 
Monin, 2003). That explanation also applies to the findings in Part 2. In Part 1 we examined 
that alternative explanation by manipulating whether photos depicted nouns that were 
unfamiliar versus familiar. We used a similar approach in Experiment 3b, except that we 
manipulated whether animals were unfamiliar (shoebill) or familiar (zebra). Photos should 
exert more powerful effects when animals are unfamiliar—that is, when photos can most help 
people bring related thoughts and images to mind.
Experiment 3b 
Method
Subjects
We recruited 314 subjects (152 females, 127 males, and 35 subjects who did not report 
their gender) from Mechanical Turk. These subjects were on average 31.44 years old (SD = 
11.15).
Design & Procedure
We used a 2 (Photo: photo, no photo) x 2 (Claim: gave food, took food) x 2 
(Familiarity: familiar animals, unfamiliar animals) mixed design, with Photo and Familiarity 
as within subject factors and Claim as the between subjects factor.
Using the method described in Experiment 1, we developed a new set of  40 familiar 
animal names (see Appendix B). We also examined the extent to which photos made people 
feel they could bring to mind related thoughts and images about these familiar animals. 
Accordingly, a separate group of  38 Mechanical Turk subjects saw the familiar animal names, 
one at a time; half  the animal names appeared with a photo of  the animal, and half  
appeared alone. Subjects rated how easy it felt to bring to mind information related to the 
animal using a scale from 1 = “Extremely difficult” to 6 = “Extremely easy.” In line with our 
idea that photos of  familiar animals should provide little help in bringing related information 
to mind, subjects’ ratings were similar whether animal names appeared with photos (M = 
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5.24, SD = 0.72) or alone (M = 5.08, SD = 0.81); that is, photos produced a trivial raw effect 
size of  0.1621, 95% CI [-0.02, .34], t(37) = 1.85, p = .07. 
Subjects saw a total of  80 animal names comprising a block of  the 40 familiar animals  
plus a block of  the 40 unfamiliar animals used in Experiments 1-3a. The order of  the blocks 
was counterbalanced between subjects. The procedure was otherwise identical to that of  
Experiment 3a.
Results & Discussion
Photos exerted stronger effects when subjects saw unfamiliar animals, compared to 
familiar animals. In fact, as Figure 8 shows, the pattern of  results is strikingly similar to those 
reported in Part 1 (Experiments 2a-c) when we also manipulated familiarity of  names. 
There are three important findings to take away from the figure. First, we found 
patterns consistent with those reported in Experiments 1-3a: for unfamiliar animal names, 
photos led people to respond true more often to the “gave food” claim, but not to the “took 
food” claim. Second, in line with our hypothesis, photos exerted stronger effects for unfamiliar 
animals—when photos could most help people bring related information to mind (but as the 
figure shows, only for the positive claim). Third, a closer look at the patterns on the “gave 
food” side of  the figure suggests that even in the absence of  photos, people were more likely 
to response true to what was easier to bring to mind—the familiar animal names. The figure 
also shows raw effect sizes, confidence intervals, and (in null hypothesis terms) a Photo x 
Claim x Familiarity interaction, F(1, 312) = 6.61, p = .01.
86
 
21 Consistent with the idea that it should be harder for people to bring to mind thoughts and images about 
unfamiliar animals compared to familiar animals, we found that the effect of  photos for familiar animals 
reported here is smaller than that of  the unfamiliar animals reported in Experiment 1, in which photos 
produced a raw effect size of  1.47, 95% CI [1.05, 1.88], t(33) = 7.16, p < .01. In null hypothesis terms, there was 
a Photo x Familiarity interaction, F (1, 70) = 36.60, p < .01.
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We replicated these patterns with another group of  Mechanical Turk subjects. To 
arrive at a more precise estimate of  the size of  the photo effect for familiar and unfamiliar 
animal names, we subjected the data from both those experiments and data from Experiment 
3a to random effects model mini meta-analyses and report those results, which are consistent 
with those reported here, in Table 2 (Cumming, 2012).  
95% CI Experiments 
included in 
calculating ES Claim Manipulation ES LL UL z p
Positive 
(“Gave food”)
Photo effect 
(Unfamiliar names)
0.26 0.18 0.34 6.53 <.01 3aᵃ, 3bᵃ, 3b Rᵇ
Photo effect 
(Familiar names)
0.04 0.02 0.07 3.29 <.01 3bᵃ, 3b Rᵇ
Negative 
(“Took food”)
Photo effect 
(Unfamiliar names) -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -2.63 .01 3aᵃ, 3bᵃ, 3b Rᵇ
Photo effect 
(Familiar names) -0.03 -0.06 0.01 -1.55 .12 3bᵃ, 3b Rᵇ
Table 2
Summary of  results from each meta analysis for Experiments 3a-b
Note. Meta analyses split by manipulations used in Experiments 3a-b. ES = effect size, the difference 
between photo and no photo means. Positive effect size = a higher proportion of  “true” responses 
when animal names appeared with photos compared to alone. LL and UL = lower and upper limits of 
the 95% CI of  the ES. R = replication of  an experiment (R1 = first replication, R2 = second 
replication, and so on). Replication 3b R used the same method as Experiment 3b.
ᵃExperiments and replications reported in the main text. ᵇReplications not otherwise reported in the 
main text. 
Experiment 3b supports the idea that the ease with which people could bring 
information about animals to mind matters. Just as in Part 1, photos that helped people make 
sense of  unfamiliar names, and therefore most helped people bring related thoughts and 
images to mind, wielded the most powerful effects over people’s judgments.
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Chapter 3
 In six experiments we examined the extent to which non-probative photos rapidly 
lead people to believe recent personal experiences happened. Across these experiments, 
photos of  animals that offered no probative information about people’s personal pasts 
nonetheless led people to think related positive (but not negative) claims were true. Photos also 
produced these patterns when people judged claims about others’ experiences, and exerted 
their strongest effects when they depicted unfamiliar animals—that is, when they could most 
help people bring related thoughts and images to mind.
In Experiment 1, photos led people to think a claim about an event that happened just 
minutes before (“I gave food to this animal”) was true. This finding fits with the idea that by 
helping people bring related thoughts and images to mind, photos quickly produce mental 
products that resemble those typical of  genuine experience (Johnson et al., 1993; see Strange 
et al., 2011). This effect also fits with work showing that increasing semantic context makes 
information seem more familiar, accurate, and true (Hansen & Wanke, 2010; Kelley & 
Lindsay, 1993; Newman et al., 2012; Westerman, 2008; Whittlesea, 1993; for reviews, see 
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). 
In Experiments 2a-c we investigated the conditions under which photos would exert 
these effects, and concluded that photos lead people to think positive events happened, but 
not negative events (a pattern consistent with those reported in Part 1). In Experiment 2a 
photos led people to respond true to the claim “I fed this animal” but not to the claim “I did 
not feed this animal,” a finding suggesting that photos do not simply make any claim about 
one’s past seem to have more merit. But there were two ways that pattern could have 
emerged. One possibility was that by making thoughts and images about animals come to 
mind easily photos made the animals feel familiar. Such a feeling would have been at odds 
with the idea that the event never happened, therefore steering people away from saying the 
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“did not feed” claim was true (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Unkelbach, 2006; Whittlesea, 1993). 
But a second possibility was that experience of  ease produced positive feelings that aligned 
with positive claims (“fed”), not with negative claims (“did not feed”). We found evidence for 
this second possibility in Experiment 2b when people evaluated one of  two claims that 
implied having an experience with animals—one that was either positive (“I gave food to this 
animal”) or negative (“I took food from this animal”)—photos led people to say only the 
positive claim was true. This pattern matches the findings from Part 1 and fits with work 
suggesting that cognitive ease “feels good” and is therefore more likely to be construed as 
evidence for positive than for negative judgments (Reber et al., 1998; Seamon et al., 1998; 
Topolinski et al., 2009; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2006).
Experiment 2c built further support for this idea by addressing a confound. Positive 
feelings of  ease could have aligned not with the outcome of  the positive actions described by 
the claims (providing food), but with the positive connotations of  those actions (giving; 
Cacioppo et al., 1999; Elliot, 2006; Lang et al., 1990; Price et al., 2012). Yet when positive 
and negative claims were both associated with a positive action (“I gave healthy food to this 
animal” versus “I gave unhealthy food to this animal”) photos led people to respond true only 
when claims implied positive outcomes (providing healthy food). And because people were 
overall just as willing to say they gave healthy food as they were to say they gave unhealthy 
food, the findings also provide evidence against the interpretation that photos selectively 
promoted the truth of  claims that described more plausible events (see Blandon-Gitlin & 
Gerkens, 2010).
Experiments 1-2c suggest that non-probative photos rapidly lead people to think 
recent positive experiences happened. We found similar patterns in Experiments 3a-b when 
people evaluated others’ pasts—a result in line with work showing that increased ease not 
only makes events seem more likely to have happened to oneself, it also makes those events 
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seem more likely to have happened to others (Bernstein et al., 2009; Bernstein et al., 2002). 
Considered as a whole, Experiments 1-3b suggested that non-probative photos create an aura 
of  belief  around positive past events.
As in Part 1, an alternative explanation was that pairing animal names with colorful, 
interesting photos made animals seem more attractive. If  so, people could have mistaken 
feelings of  attraction for familiarity which—due to its many positive connotations—seemed 
like evidence for positive claims (Garcia-Marques et al., 2013; Monin, 2003; Schwarz, 2004). 
In Experiment 3b we found patterns at odds with that explanation. Photos exerted stronger 
effects when they depicted unfamiliar animals compared to familiar animals, a finding 
suggesting a mechanism not about the attractiveness of  photos, but about the ease with which 
they bring related thoughts and images to mind. Indeed, even in the absence of  these 
potentially attractive photos, people responded more positively when animals were familiar, 
and therefore easier to bring to mind (see Whittlesea, 1993; Winkielman et al., 2003; Zajonc, 
1968).
Of  course, a critic might argue that because the evidence for this mechanism came 
from an experiment in which people evaluated claims about others’ pasts (Experiment 3b), we 
cannot be certain it applies to when people evaluated claims about their own pasts 
(Experiments 1-2c). That is true. But there is no reason to suspect the mechanism would 
change across other’s pasts versus people’s own pasts. After all, a large body of  literature 
shows that increasing cognitive ease affects how people make decisions about their personal 
pasts (Bernstein et al., 2002; Whittlesea, 1993; for reviews, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Jacoby et al., 1989; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). And feelings of  ease have similar effects 
over how people evaluate the pasts of  others (Bernstein et al., 2009). Thus, the patterns across 
all of  the experiments we reported fit best with the idea that photos operated by making it 
easier for people to bring related thoughts and images to mind.
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In fact, the set of  findings from Parts 1 and 2 both support that mechanism, and 
overall tell similar stories. In each experiment photos depicted unfamiliar, difficult to represent 
words—the nouns in wine names (rick), or the names of  animals (shoebill). And even though 
those photos were non-probative with respect to the claims people were evaluating, they led 
people to think positive claims were true. Both sets of  findings suggested photos exerted these 
effects by making it easier for people to bring to mind (or comprehend) these unfamiliar 
words. Those mental experiences would have been just as non-probative as the photos that 
produced them. But people’s bias to assume that feelings arising during a task are relevant—
coupled with the positive spin they impose on ease—would have bolstered the positive claims 
(Higgins, 1998; Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman et al., 2003). 
Theoretical Implications
Because the findings from Parts 1 and 2 are so similar, their theoretical implications 
also overlap. For instance, the set of  findings from Part 2 fit with the idea described in Part 1 
that photos might increase positive evaluations not just by helping people access known 
concepts, but also by helping people learn new concepts. The difference is a matter of  
context. People learned what an animal was (a shoebill is a large bird), rather than what a 
word in a wine name meant (a rick is a haystack); and people might have misread feelings 
from that learning as being about their own (or another person’s) past, rather than about the 
quality of  a product. Indeed, assuming that feelings associated with learning are just as open 
to interpretation as feelings associated with accessing known concepts, then they too should 
be interpreted as being “about” whatever is the focus of  people’s task—whether that is a 
product, or a personally experienced event (Higgins, 1998; Kronlund & Bernstein, 2006; 
Schwarz, 2004; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998).
Both sets of  findings are also captured under the source monitoring framework 
(Johnson et al., 1993). The result that photos led people to believe events happened (Part 2) 
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supports the source monitoring framework’s proposition that streamlining the mental 
operations people are experiencing in the present systematically changes how they interpret 
the past—leading people to think experiences happened or are real (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson & Mitchell, 2006; Kelley & 
Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008, 2014; Whittlesesa, 1993). A similar interpretation fits the data 
in Part 1; the difference is that rather than construing ease as evidence about one’s past, 
people construed ease as evidence about the quality of  a product (see Lindsay, 2008). But 
categorizing these findings as source monitoring errors is really just another way of  saying 
that people use feelings of  cognitive ease—sometimes mistakenly—as evidence for their 
judgments, particularly when other more relevant information is sparse (Schwarz & Clore, 
2007; Unkelbach, 2007). 
Indeed, we draw on the fluidity of  our ongoing cognitive operations whenever we are 
forced to guess about the world, assuming that if  things are running surprisingly smoothly 
“inside,” that represents something good about what is “out there”—be that its familiarity, 
attractiveness, value, or some other quality (Schwarz, 2002; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013; 
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a, 2001b). And because these are 
not random guesses, but predictions based on correlations in the real world, our judgments 
are on target more often than not (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Halberstadt, 2009; 
Halberstadt & Catty, 2008; Johnson et al., 1993; Unkelbach, 2006, 2007). The effects 
demonstrated in Parts 1 and 2 reveal evidence of  those relatively rare instances in which our 
predictions are off  target (for reviews, see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz, 2004; 
Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013). But that is just our cognitive system doing its job: using the 
limited information it has to make educated guesses about the world that are efficient, often 
accurate, but sometimes erroneous (Damasio, 1994; Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Treyens, 1981; 
Carmichael, 1932).
93
 
To what extent do non-probative photos cause the subjective experience of  remembering? 
An important question in the false memory literature is “What was it about the mental 
characteristics people had in mind that led people to decide the event happened?” (Jacoby et 
al., 1989; Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008, 2014). That is because there is more than one 
basis for deciding that an event happened (see Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980; Rajaram, 1993). 
A common distinction is between when people “remember” an event and when they just 
“know” it occurred. People’s subjective experience could be that they are reliving the details 
of  an event (what would be classified as “remembering”). Or people’s subjective experience 
could be one of  pure certainty that the event occurred without being able to retrieve details to 
confirm that knowledge (what would be classified as “knowing”; Gardiner, 1988; Rajaram, 
1993, 1996; Tulving, 1985). 
Because the mental characteristics associated people’s subjective experiences of  
“remembering” are typically more detailed than those associated with “knowing,” examining 
which of  those experiences non-probative photos produce would provide insight into their 
immediate power to cause false memories (see Strange et al., 2011). The more photos 
encourage “remember” relative to “know” responses, the more people’s mental characteristics 
match those expected of  reality, and the further people are down the track to false memories 
(Hyman, Gilstrap, Decker, & Wilkinson, 1998; Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999; Johnson et al., 
1993; Lindsay et al., 2004; Mazzoni et al., 2001; Paddock, Terranova, Kwok, & Halpern, 
2000; Scoboria et al., 2004). 
So which of  these subjective experiences might non-probative photos have caused? As 
much as we would like to claim that photos immediately created false “remembering,” there 
are reasons to suspect they would not have.
We know that increasing fluency increases feelings of  familiarity (Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Whittlesea, 1993). Moreover, feelings of  familiarity are linked to the subjective 
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experience of  “knowing” more so than “remembering” (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-
Klavehn, 1998; Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). In one study, people explained 
what made them decide to assign “know” and “remember” responses to words they 
recognized from a list; for “know” responses people typically explained that the words just 
seemed familiar, but for “remember” responses people offered details about the context in 
which they saw the word, such as what it looked like or the thoughts they had at the time they 
saw it (Gardiner et al., 1998). Given the links between fluency, familiarity, and “knowing,” we 
might expect that if  photos increase conceptual fluency they would promote the experience of 
“knowing,” not “remembering.”
Indeed, other work shows that increased fluency (perceptual, or conceptual) selectively 
promotes the subjective experience of  “knowing” (Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000; 
Wang & Yonelinas, 2012). In another study, people decided whether they had seen target 
words (book) in an earlier phase of  the experiment. When target words appeared after related 
words (author), people more often thought they had seen them, compared to when target 
words appeared after unrelated words (tree). But, more to the point, the related words 
increased people’s reports of  “knowing,” but not “remembering” (Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). 
These findings suggest that if  photos work by helping people bring related thoughts 
and images to mind, boosting conceptual fluency, they might selectively promote “know” 
responses22. So although photos might make people more likely to believe (positive) events 
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22 The idea that non-probative photos would cause “knowing” more so than “remembering” conflicts with the 
findings from Strange et al. (2011). In their study, when people read news headlines paired with non-probative 
photos, people reported “remembering” more than “knowing.” We cannot say for sure why that would be, given 
the literature described here. But we can speculate. In Strange et al.’s study, people’s expectations for recalling 
news events should have been low, given that the news headlines described events that had supposedly happened 
years before (Johnson et al., 1988; Johnson et al., 1993). Perhaps people’s low expectations (coupled with the 
suggestion that all the events actually did occur) made them willing to claim they “remembered” after gleaning 
few details from photos. It is difficult to say what people’s expectations would have been for recalling details in 
our experiments. The recency of  the events could have caused the expectation that people would be able to 
recall details—expectations photos could not meet, and would therefore fail to encourage “remember” 
responses. But considering our difficult encoding conditions, we think it is more plausible that people’s 
expectations for recalling details were extremely low (probably lower than in Strange et al.’s study). Perhaps 
under conditions where people expect not to recall any detail, photos and other manipulations that boost 
conceptual processing would be more likely to encourage “knowing” responses.
happened, they may not produce the subjective experience of  remembering those events—at 
least, not immediately.
Could non-probative photos encourage the processes that turn “knowing” into “remembering”?
Of  course, “known” events can become “remembered” ones (Hyman & Kleinknecht, 
1999). Getting people to spend time thinking about or imagining events they claimed to only 
“know” happened makes people subsequently rate those “known” events as more like 
“remembered” ones (Hyman et al., 1998; Paddock et al., 2000). 
In fact, the mere conviction that an event happened should encourage those processes 
that turn “knowns” to “remembers.” Just consider what typically happens when a face pops 
out at you from the crowd, evoking a feeling of  familiarity (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). 
That feeling may not bring with it details about who the person is, how you met them, and 
when that meeting occurred, but it should make you confident you have seen the face and 
lead you to try retrieving details about the person (Jacoby et al., 1989; Mandler, 1980). After 
some time dwelling on the face, you might recollect (or concoct) details about meeting this 
person at a party, the friends that introduced you, and the snippets of  conversation you had. 
Right or wrong, those details could end up seeming like evidence that you “remember” how 
you know that person (Lindsay, 2008, 2014). 
Non-probative photos could promote an analogous process. By causing people to feel 
they just know the event occurred, photos might make people believe they could retrieve more 
about the event if  they tried. And people’s attempts to do so could turn what was once merely 
a feeling, a belief, into a detailed memory—one people might ultimately mistake as evidence 
of  genuine experience (Hyman & Kleinknect, 1999; Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay et al., 2004; 
Wade et al., 2002). Thus, even if  non-probative photos do not immediately create detailed 
false memories, by making events seem “known” to have happened they might encourage the 
processes that do.
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One step toward testing that idea would be to set up an experiment similar to the ones 
reported in Part 2. But rather than deciding whether each event occurred, people would 
decide whether they think they could retrieve more details about each event (see Lindsay, 
Wade, Hunter, & Read, 2004). If  photos lead people to think they could retrieve more, that 
would support the hypothesis that photos do not just immediately cause false beliefs—by 
doing so they also spur the processes that drive false memories.
Are the effects of  non-probative photos tied to positive events?
In our experiments, non-probative photos exerted their effects for positive events, but 
not for negative events—a pattern we suspect relates to the pleasure people derive from easily 
bringing information to mind (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). The idea that photos make 
positive events seem more likely by evoking feelings consistent with those events implies that 
photos could also make negative events seem more likely if  they evoke negative feelings. 
Imagine that the photos we used in Part 2 depicted animals that were scary, deformed, 
or just plain ugly. Just as with the more “neutral” versions of  the photos, these “negative” 
photos should help people bring related thoughts and images to mind. But the content of  
those thoughts would have relatively more negative associations, and therefore cause negative 
feelings (Bower, 1981; see Lee & Labroo, 2004). Those feelings would provide no evidence a 
negative event really happened, but might nonetheless seem like evidence that it did. Of  
course, this possibility hinges on people not realizing their feelings are caused by the negative 
image, because they would otherwise deem those feelings irrelevant for the task at hand 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007). 
The extent to which non-probative photos immediately make negative events seem 
more believable is an area worthy of  future research, particularly because the literature on 
false memories for entire autobiographical events grew out of  the concern that people were 
developing painful memories (of  abuse) in therapy (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993; 
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Shobe & Kihlstrom, 1997). Although our findings work against the idea that non-probative 
photos make negative events believable, that should not be taken to mean they cannot 
contribute to negative false memories; rather, the findings hint that photos may be 
immediately less likely to do so. 
Practical Implications
These findings have practical implications for the law. The idea that non-probative 
photos immediately make people inclined to believe events happened suggests investigators 
exercise caution when using photos to “jog” suspects’ and eyewitness’ memories (see Henkel, 
2011; Henkel & Carbuto, 2008). Suppose you could not recall much about an event you were 
involved in or had witnessed (perhaps due to intoxication). Seeing a related but non-probative 
photo could make you more inclined to believe it happened, even if  it did not. And that belief 
could encourage you to try retrieving more information, ultimately leaving you with a 
“memory” that does not truly reflect the details of  the event (Johnson et al., 1993). If  you 
were a suspect and decided to divulge your memory to the police, it may be used as evidence 
against you; and if  you were an eyewitness you might confidently recount that memory to 
jurors.
Related concerns apply to the decisions of  jurors, who will not have experienced the 
crime but must decide whether (or in what way) others were involved. Non-probative photos 
might make jurors inclined to believe claims about a suspect’s involvement in a crime 
(Newman & Feigenson, 2013). And such a belief  may have downstream effects on jurors’ 
interpretations of  subsequent evidence; jurors could unwittingly confirm the belief  photos 
forged by selectively attending to consistent evidence, while ignoring inconsistent evidence 
(Nickerson, 1998; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). This possibility raises an interesting question: 
would photos be most influential if  presented early on in the sequence of  evidence, and least 
influential later? We suspect the answer is yes. The feelings photos produce should be most 
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persuasive before people have a firm hypothesis about how a crime unfolded (Monin, 2003; 
Unkelbach, 2007). 
Another decision jurors might face is whether a defendant is liable for an outcome. 
That decision requires determining how foreseeable, and therefore preventable, the outcome 
was. A large body of  literature suggests that jurors have trouble ignoring known outcomes to 
estimate how foreseeable that outcome should have been; that is, they tend to think the 
outcome was more foreseeable than it actually was—an effect known as hindsight bias (Blank, 
Musch, & Pohl, 2007; Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999). That literature also shows that 
feelings of  fluency can increase hindsight bias, suggesting that photos might wield similar 
effects (Bernstein & Harley, 2007). If  so, photos could lead people to perceive the 
consequences of  another person’s actions as more foreseeable, and charge that person as 
more liable or negligent (see Harley, 2007).
A critic might have begun to wonder why we think photos could promote beliefs about 
crimes. After all, our findings suggest photos selectively lead people to think positive events 
happened, and crimes typically involve negative events. Although we too believe most crimes 
center around negative events, it is not so rare that seemingly trivial details of  crimes (the tool 
used to break into the house) end up being the evidence that “gets the guy” or “closes a case.” 
So even if  the crime itself  is negative, these other trivial aspects of  crimes could be positive (or 
neutral23). If  photos make these aspects of  a crime seem more likely, related claims could also 
seem to have more merit. Through that route, photos could sway decisions about even 
negative events. 
Moreover, jurors’ status of  “fact finder” could twist how they interpret the positive 
feelings arising while they evaluate details of  a crime. Their task is to solve a problem, to piece 
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23 In one version of  these experiments (and a replication) we asked people to do neutral actions with animals (for 
example, “Paint the animal’s cage yellow”) then tested them on those actions. Photos led people to think those 
relatively more neutral experiences happened, a raw bias effect of  -0.10, 95% CI[-0.17, -.02] for the original 
experiment, and -0.07, 95% CI[-0.14, 0.01] for the replication.
together evidence and arrive at the best guess about what really happened. In that context, it 
seems unlikely that people would focus on determining whether the crime itself  was morally 
right or wrong. More likely is that people would focus on determining the accuracy of  the 
evidence presented. That frame of  mind might lead people to interpret ease as evidence that 
specific facts are accurate or true, despite that the crime itself  is negative (Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Toplinski & Reber, 2010). Of  course, given the serious nature 
of  jurors’ task, it is also plausible that they would approach the evidence more analytically, 
which would steer them away from drawing on feelings to evaluate facts of  the case 
(Halberstadt & Catty, 2008; Halberstadt, 2009). 
These legal implications are worrying not just because of  the serious nature of  the 
events people are evaluating, but because we doubt that it is widely known that non-probative 
photos can have these immediate effects (and long term effects, for that matter). Although we 
know of  no work examining people’s beliefs about non-probative photos, our hunch is that 
most people (including police investigators, judges, and lawyers) would consider it ludicrous 
that a photo—one that did not depict a crime or suggest it occurred, but that merely helped 
people consider an aspect of  it—could produce the effects reported in this thesis. 
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Appendix A
Table A.
Wine names used in the experiments.
Unfamiliar names Familiar names
Rare Cylix Early Rose
Yellow Rick Scarlet Apples
Blue Larkspur Private Beach
Fancy Phaeton Old Letters
Rich Dais Idle Road
Dark Sloe Deep Well
Big Prow Open Window
Nobel Leghorn Vacant Coast
Fresh Plaice Nine Mirrors
Last Aster Blind Artist
Shiny Pommel Busy City
Broad Bole Slow River
Crooked Nave Cheery Cottage
Ornate Cornice Fat Bottles
Two Yuccas First Tulip
Heavy Pestle Straight Tunnel
Little Wherry Rural Hills
Dry Sward One Candle
Southern Morass Fair Gardens
Great Frieze Eternal Fog
Coarse Tapis Empty Kettle
Magic Coffer Calm Lake
Quiet Rote Native Flower
Tranquil Fane Humble Mountain
Eerie Lune Green Banks
Fussy Cuttle Angry Horse
Golden Hank Gray Rat 
Clear Tarn Dusty Clock
Abundant Marl Stubborn Ship
Mystic Betel Ancient Key
Note. We used the unfamiliar wine names in all experiments, and added familiar wine names 
in Experiments 2a-c.
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Appendix B
Table B. 
Animal names used in the experiments.
Unfamiliar animals Familiar animals
Banteng Giraffe
Kagu Parrot
Chuckwalla Lizard
Dhole Wolf
Capybara Rabbit
Onager Lion
Chital Tiger
Avocet Sparrow
Colocolo Baboon
Uguisu Crow
Hammerkop Pelican
Takin Zebra
Partincole Dove
Aardwolf Cheetah
Adjutant Flamingo
Argali Moose
Dik-dik Deer
Biscacha Beaver
Coypu Seal
Zonure Turtle
Carancho Eagle
Addax Elephant
Anole Frog
Shoebill Owl
Accentor Bat
Fossa Bear
Aasvogel Ostrich
Grysbok Kangaroo
Gundi Raccoon
Hutia Fox
Antechinus Otter
Guillemot Goose
Bittern Turkey
Gannet Duck
Anhinga Peacock
Pika Squirrel
Barisingha Sheep
Colobus Gorilla
Dunnart Skunk
Ibex Camel
Note. We used unfamiliar animals in all experiments, and added familiar animals in 
Experiment 3b.
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Appendix C
Table C. 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for hits, false alarms, c, and d’ measures of  Experiments 1-2c.
Hits False alarms Bias (c) Sensitivity (d’)
Experiment Claim Photo No 
Photo
Photo No 
Photo
Photo No 
Photo
Photo No 
Photo
1 “Gave food” .57 (.16) .51 (.17) .54 (.18) .47 (.17) -.15 (.42) .03 (.35) .09 (.57) .12 (.69)
2a
“Fed” .58 (.22) .53 (.21) .42 (.22) .34 (.22) .00 (.58) .22 (.50) .54 (1.03) .65 (1.13)
“Did not feed” .59 (.20) .55 (.22) .49 (.19) .48 (.18) -.11 (.44) -.05 (.46) .32 (.94) .23 (.91)
2b
“Gave food” .57 (.21) .52 (.22) .52 (.22) .49 (.20) -.17 (.59) -.02 (.56) .17 (.83) .12 (.96)
“Took food” .52 (.21) .52 (.21) .47 (.21) .46 (.21) .03 (.53) .05 (.53) .17 (.95) .21 (.98)
2c
“Healthy” .58 (.21) .53 (.23) .50 (.22) .44 (.23) -.12 (.60) .06 (.66) .26 (.90) .32 (.99)
“Unhealthy” .53 (.22) .52 (.21) .48 (.23) .50 (.22) .00 (.64) -.02 (.60) .16 (.94) .07 (.96)
Note. Hits = the proportion of  times people responded true to claims that were true. False 
alarms = the proportion of  times people responded true to claims that were false. Bias (c) = 
the z-converted hits plus the z-converted false alarms, averaged, then multiplied by negative 
one, with negative values of  bias representing a liberal criterion (a tendency to respond 
“true”) and positive values representing a conservative criterion (a tendency to respond 
“false”; measured in standard deviation units to represent the distance between people’s 
criterion and the half-way point between the signal and noise distributions, or what would be 
considered a neutral criterion). Sensitivity (d’) = the z-converted hits minus the z-converted 
false alarms (higher values indicate better accuracy; measured in standard deviation units to 
represent the amount of  overlap between the signal and noise distributions). Hit and false 
alarm rates that would be undefined when z-converted were adjusted such that hit and false 
alarm rates of  1 and 0 were changed to .99 and .01, respectively (Wickens, 2002).
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